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 Abstract 
This dissertation examines the interplay between school district 
assignment and reassignment policies and the elementary public school 
parents select for their children.  The sample in all chapters includes 
the third and fourth grade students in a subset of growing North 
Carolina school districts from 2003/04 to 2010/11.  The data are 
derived from historical, longitudinal secondary data sources containing 
student, school, and district records.  All chapters employ 
quantitative longitudinal data analysis methods.  Chapter 1 identifies 
the groups of students who do not comply with their school assignments.  
Chapter 2 identifies the groups of students who are reassigned to 
different schools, and to schools of varying quality, when school 
districts enact reassignment plans.  Chapter 3 identifies the groups of 
students who do not comply with school reassignments.  Together, the 
chapters demonstrate the interplay between residential decisions, 
school choices, and the resulting educational opportunities of 
observably different students.  Consistent with existing bodies of 
literature, the findings demonstrate unexplored processes through which 
advantaged families maintain the most desirable educational 
opportunities for their children.  Policy implications of these 
findings are also discussed.   
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 Introduction 
 
United States public school districts are responsible for 
designing and implementing student assignment plans.  Assignment 
policies define the environment in which the student studies, the 
educational resources available to her, and the teachers to whom she is 
exposed.  Generally, students are assigned to specific schools 
according to zones of residence.  As a consequence, parents who can 
afford to choose homes have greater capacity to select school 
assignments than families with less financial capital.  As population 
dynamics shift within a district, schools open and close and some 
students must be reassigned.  This dissertation focuses on these 
assignment and reassignment policies.  The sample in all three chapters 
is the third and fourth grade students, their schools, and their 
parents in a subset of growing North Carolina school districts from 
2003/04 to 2010/11.   
Research on school assignment and reassignment policies was not 
previously possible.  Access to both precise longitudinal student 
address data and to school district assignments over time is rare.  To 
the best of my knowledge, they have never been linked.  Scholars often 
lament the dearth of data on family residences and when they have it, 
many proxy school assignment by distance to school, for school 
assignments are not known (eg. Butler et al. 2013).  The North Carolina 
Education Research Data Center at Duke University granted me access to 
their exact student address data.  I then applied GIS techniques to a 
longitudinal panel of student assignment data to generate map layers 
reflecting attendance zones over time.  Merging these unique data 
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elements together, I created a new dataset with precise linkage of 
students to school assignments and reassignments.  Having such precise 
geographic records for both family location and school assignment on 
this scale is largely impossible given existing secondary data.  The 
result of my data collection efforts not only enabled the work 
described herein, but could also be applied to other education policy 
research questions for which precise student geographic data is 
required.   
Indicators representing students’ assignments as urban, suburban, 
or rural are derived from the National Center for Education Statistic’s 
urban-centric coding scheme that describes a school’s location relative 
to an urbanized area1.  I collapsed the 12 urban-centric codes into 
three categories: urban, suburban (which includes all suburban and town 
classifications) and rural.  Of note, the geographic indicators 
throughout this dissertation are based on the school location to which 
a student is assigned rather than her address.  Given the relatively 
small size of most elementary school catchment areas, schools of a 
given geographic classification should draw students predominantly from 
that geographic type.   
The school districts in this sample are all growing in population 
and have a mixture of school types: three of the districts contain both 
suburban and rural schools and three contain suburban, urban, urban, 
1 NCES codes are based on urban-centric criteria.  Urban is defined as a 
territory inside an urbanized area with a population of at least 100,000; 
Suburban is defined as a territory outside a principal city and inside an 
urbanized area with a population at least 100,000 or a territory inside an 
urban cluster; Rural is defined as a census-defined rural territory of varying 
proximity to urban areas and urban clusters  
(http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/rural_locales.asp). 
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and rural schools.  North Carolina is not unique in this regard: all 50 
states have at least one school district with both suburban and rural 
schools, and 48 states (every state other than Hawaii and Vermont) have 
this mixture of suburban and rural schools along with student 
population growth from 2003/04-2010/112.  In the 2010-11 school year, of 
the 47.2 million traditional public school K-12 students in the United 
States, nearly half (47.5 percent) attended schools in school districts 
with suburban and rural schools, and nearly a quarter (23.3 percent) 
attended schools in districts with urban, suburban, and rural schools.  
14.6 million students (31 percent of the nation’s traditional public 
school students) attended schools in growing districts with both rural 
and suburban schools.  Given these commonalities between the districts 
in this sample and others across the nation, the findings from this 
dissertation have the potential to be relevant for many locations 
outside of the sample school districts and state.   
Literature on the sociology of education teaches us that 
advantaged families are generally able to construct the most optimal 
educational opportunities for their children.  These families produce 
advantages for their children both between- and within-schools.  School 
quality is positively correlated with housing prices (Black 1999; 
Figlio and Lucas 2004; Ries and Sommerville 2010; Dhar and Ross 2012), 
which means advantaged families pay more for homes with desirable 
school assignments.  Advantaged families also lobby for better teachers 
and educational tracks (Hoover-Dempsey and Sander 1995; Lareau 2000; 
2 These totals were calculated by the author using public National Center for 
Education Statistics data on each public school in the country and its 
associated NCES location code, described above.  The 2010-11 school year was 
the most current year of public access data at the time of writing.   
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Oakes 1992), and pursue gifted and other specialized school programs 
(Ball 2004; Bifulco, Ladd, Ross 2009; Lareau 2000).  School district 
student assignment and reassignment policies set the distributional 
patterns of students among schools within each district.  Advantaged 
families utilize this process to further construct and maintain 
improved educational opportunities for their children in three core 
ways: they can afford to live in homes with the most desirable school 
assignments (Chapter 1), they influence the policy process to avoid 
adverse reassignments (Chapter 2), and they often opt out of disruptive 
school reassignments (Chapter 3).  
Chapter 1 identifies the groups of students who do not comply 
with their school assignments.  Based on these observed decisions not 
to comply, one can make inferences about who is and who is not content 
with their school assignments.  Certain subgroups of these discontent 
families, particularly urban families, have greater school choice 
options available to them and they frequently take them.  Black 
students, regardless of having an urban, suburban, or rural school 
assignment are the least likely racial subgroup to comply with their 
assignments.  Suburban families are the most likely student subgroup to 
adhere to their school assignments.  If school choice options that 
break the link between residential location and school assignments were 
expanded, urban and black students would be the most likely groups to 
partake.  Many suburban families have already met their school 
preference through the housing market.  Therefore, they should not be 
as influenced by changes in school choice policies. 
Chapter 2 identifies the groups of students who are reassigned to 
different schools, and to schools of varying quality, when school 
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districts enact reassignment plans.  By inference, those families who 
are reassigned to worse schools are less empowered in the political 
process.  The evidence shows that rural and urban families are more 
likely to be reassigned than are suburban families.  Suburban families 
avoid reassignments, particularly reassignments to schools of lower 
quality.  Suburban families, who generated school assignment advantages 
through residential choices, also mobilize their political capital to 
construct and maintain the best educational opportunities for their 
children.  These findings again echo existing social stratification 
literature on how advantaged families “hoard” opportunities for 
themselves (Tilly 1998).  
Chapter 3 identifies the groups of students who do not comply 
with school reassignments.  Behavioral economics research on defaults 
teaches us that individuals generally prefer the simplest, default 
option (Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Thaler and Bernatzi 2004; Gale, 
Iwry, Orszag 2005; Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Madrian and Shea 2001; 
Tversky and Shafer 1992), unless there is a reason to opt out of the 
default (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, and Liu 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 
2003).  Applied to student reassignments, the policies dictate that 
some students need to change schools in non-promotional years.  This 
unexpected school move is a sufficient enough disruption to prompt 
parents to opt out of the plans.  Indeed, over half of reassigned 
families do not comply with their reassignments.  The most common 
behavior is for students to continue to attend their original schools, 
in spite of being reassigned to a new location.  Urban students are the 
most likely subgroup not to comply with reassignments.  Despite being 
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highly unlikely to be reassigned, suburban non-poor families also opt 
out of their reassignments when they do occur.   
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Chapter 1- What Types of Students are most 
likely to Opt Out of their Traditional 
Public School Assignments? 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter identifies the observable characteristics of 
students who opt out of their traditional public school assignments.  
The overall goals are to introduce the dataset that will be used in the 
three dissertation chapters, to identify the overall rate of school 
assignment noncompliance across student subgroups, and to use the 
revealed parent decision to make inferences about how content families 
are with their neighborhood schools.  The results indicate that many 
families indeed select a non-assigned school, and these choices are 
most common in urban area.  These findings, along with the more nuanced 
subgroup patterns by race, socioeconomic status, and geography, provide 
insights about parents’ contentment with their assigned schools 
relative to their alternatives.   
Individual elementary schools within a given school district 
frequently vary in quality, and parents typically try to find the best 
schools for their children.  Geographic locations generally determine 
school assignments at the time parents choose to buy or rent housing; 
however, not all students attend their assigned schools.  The 
interaction of residential and school choice decisions of families with 
student assignment and school choice policies determine what school a 
student attends.  We might expect choices to attend a non-assigned 
school to be positively correlated with income; however, more 
advantaged families are able to purchase or rent homes with desirable 
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school assignments.  Since the decision to opt out of a school 
assignment temporally occurs after residential selection, those choices 
might be most common among families with less financial flexibility to 
select a home with a desirable school assignment.   
School assignments matter for student opportunities because the 
quality of schools differs across schools within a single district in 
terms of teacher quality (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, and Wheeler 2006; 
Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2011; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2002), 
students’ academic performance (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005; 
Goldsmith 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin 2009; Roza et al. 2004), curriculum 
options and teacher expectations (Oakes 1990), and financial resources 
(Condron and Roscigno 2003; Rubenstein et al. 2007).  Students at 
schools with wealthier students tend to perform better than students at 
poorer schools (Anyon 1980).   
Families consider certain school assignments to be more desirable 
than others.  Families might prefer a non-assigned school based on the 
characteristics of the students or the teachers, including the racial 
or socioeconomic composition of the students, and the quality of the 
teachers and principal.  Many school districts allow some degree of 
choice among the public school options.  Choice options break the link 
between place of residence and the school assignment.  These choice 
policies are often designed with disadvantaged students in mind.  Their 
goal often is to allow students assigned to low performing schools an 
opportunity to attend a better school.   
Schools of choice can be explicit, such that all or at least a 
large segment of the students are not assigned to those schools based 
on residence.  Magnet, charter, and year-round schools are common 
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examples.  Another option is when parents opt out of their assigned 
schools and students attend a non-assigned, non-explicit school of 
choice.  For example, parents might petition the district to allow 
their child to attend a different traditional public school in the 
district.  These requests are most commonly granted when the child has 
a sibling at a different school, when she previously attended the other 
school and wants to remain there, or if there is a specialized academic 
program (eg. for exceptional or gifted students) for the child at the 
school.   
Opting out of school assignments is a choice only some families 
make.  On the one hand, advantaged families likely have greater social 
and political connections to enroll their students in their most 
desired option.  On the other hand, advantaged families are better 
equipped, particularly financially, to live in a residence that is 
assigned to more desirable schools, thereby reducing the need to opt 
out of assignments.  Disadvantaged families are financially limited in 
their capacity to select residences in the best school catchment areas; 
however, if policies are designed to improve poor students’ educational 
opportunities, these disadvantaged families might be more likely to opt 
for a school of choice.   
This discussion generates one primary line of questioning: to 
identify the observable differences in the types of students who do not 
comply with their school assignments.  Evidence in this line of inquiry 
will make it possible to make inferences about how content parents are 
with their child’s school assignment.  If parents were all pleased with 
their assignments, we would observe high rates of adherence to the 
school district policies.  High rates of non-adherence to school 
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assignments indicate, at the very least, a preference for alternate 
schools over families’ assigned schools.  This study is empirical and 
is based on a convenience subsample of growing North Carolina public 
school districts and their respective third and fourth grade students 
between 2003/04 and 2010/11.   
 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
This study examines children in a sample of school districts in 
North Carolina.  Data are used on the characteristics of students to 
predict how the demographic characteristics of children are associated 
with the odds of opting out of one’s school assignment.  The school a 
student attends is a two-step process by families.  First, families 
select a residence that has an associated school assignment.  Next, the 
family can choose to send their child to a non-assigned school.  This 
research addresses the overall noncompliance with school assignments 
and also investigates the differences in opt out decisions by the 
geography of assignments (to urban, suburban, or rural schools) and by 
students’ socioeconomic status.   
Motivating the subgroup analysis by socioeconomic status is the 
fact that while choice policies are often designed with disadvantaged 
students in mind, accessing and acting on the information required to 
benefit from these school choice plans can be more challenging for 
disadvantaged families.  Motivating the subgroup analysis by geographic 
type are the differences in school quality and composition across 
locations.  Suburban homes are typically more expensive than rural or 
urban alternatives, so these families tend to have the greatest 
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financial resources in a district.  Urban residents are more likely to 
be nonwhite than in the suburbs or rural areas, and urban schools 
generally have the highest concentration of poor students.  Rural 
patterns are mixed.  Often, these families are more likely to be white, 
but they also tend to be less advantaged than whites who live in the 
suburbs.  The range of affordability of various residential locations 
can lead to varying desires for parents to opt out of their affiliated 
school assignments.  In these dissertation chapters, the geographic 
designations refer to the urban, suburban, or rural status designated 
to each school location according to United States census demarcations.  
Given that most elementary school zones are small, and I have precise 
school assignments, the geographic indicators for the students are a 
reasonable proxy for the geography of their neighborhood.   
The findings from the analyses can be used to make inferences 
about how content families are with their default school assignment, 
according to whether or not students actually attend their assigned 
schools.  Figure 1 illustrates the interplay between district policies 
and parents’ decisions in producing students’ school of record.  
Although past school district decisions regarding school locations, 
school assignment plans, and school choice options, and parents’ 
residential decisions are each important processes in their own right, 
these processes (all white boxes in the figure below) will be treated 
as givens in the analyses.  By identifying whether a student attends 
her assigned school, it becomes possible to make inferences about her 
parents’ satisfaction with her school assignment.  Families who do not 
follow school assignments can be assumed either to be displeased with 
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their assigned school or at least to be pleased more with an alternate 
school over their assignment.   
 Figure 1: Interaction between Parents’ Choices and School 
District Policies 
Those who do comply with assignments likely fall into one of 
three categories.  First, and most obviously, they might be pleased 
with their assignments.  Families may have even selected their 
residence specifically so as to be assigned to that school.  Second, 
families could be content, though not ecstatic, with their assignments.  
These families might have determined that their school is acceptable, 
or even good, and not worth opting for a different school of choice.  
Third, they might not like the assigned school, yet they may not have 
sufficient information or resources to opt out of their assignment.  
Regardless of which phenomenon drives parents’ decisions to opt for a 
different school, families that do not comply with their assignments 
prefer some other school to their assigned school.  In addition, some 
of the compliers might also be discontent.  Therefore, noncompliance 
with school assignments provides a conservative, lower bound estimate 
of parents’ dissatisfaction with their assigned neighborhood school.   
This chapter highlights the interaction between parents’ 
decisions and school district policies as having direct and substantive 
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impacts on students.  This research contributes to broader literature 
of two types.  First, social science literature highlights how middle 
class families work the education system to their advantage.  This 
chapter provides the opportunity to identify a possible additional 
mechanism through which advantaged parents create and maintain better 
educational opportunities for their children.  Second, the research 
demonstrates an additional mechanism through which school districts 
influence schools, students, and families.  For example, school 
districts are responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of school 
properties, including acquiring new land and building new schools when 
needed.  They also set hiring rules regarding teacher distribution and 
pay among schools.  Districts additionally regulate both teacher and 
student transfer policies and select the curriculum and materials to be 
used at schools.  Finally, and most relevant for this analysis, 
districts set assignment policies, which determine the schools students 
attend. 
 
1.3 The Role of School District Policies in Student 
Assignments 
 
Regional planners often assist school districts to design 
attendance boundaries; however, the resulting plans typically contain 
catchment areas of different shapes and sizes, and with sometimes 
centered but more often off-centered schools in the regions.  Figure 2 
illustrates school assignments in the 2010-11 academic year for Union 
County, North Carolina.  In the figure, school catchment areas are 
delineated by different colors, and the school locations are designated 
by small, red flags.  The figure demonstrates the different sizes and 
 
13 
 
shapes of catchment areas.  The fully exhaustive, mutually exclusive 
regions comprise the school districts’ geographic landscape.  A student 
residing within any of these geographic regions will be assigned to the 
school in that zone.   
In the case of Union County, some assignments follow major roads 
while others do not.  Average commute distances and average commuting 
times vary.  There is little consistency between school zones as to 
what distance of a residence to the physical school location will 
ensure assignment to that school.  In this chapter, I only include 
districts that use this most common form of school assignments, namely 
where the typical school region in the district is contiguous3.   
3 During the course of this panel, Wake County (Raleigh, NC) utilized a system 
of assignments where most schools contained multiple non-contiguous regions for 
the same school.  The intent of that plan was to generate more equitable school 
populations based on students’ socioeconomic status.  I do not study Wake 
County, or other school districts that employ non-traditional balancing 
assignments, because that type of assignment is very rare in the United States.   
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  (http://fpc.ucps.k12.nc.us/documents/ES_Locations.pdf) 
Figure 2: Union County Elementary School Assignments 2010-2011  
 Despite these assignment maps, not all students attend their 
assigned schools.  Several school choice options exist, including 
magnet schools and year-round schools.  The extent to which the options 
are available is at the discretion of school districts and sometimes 
dictated by state policy.  For example, North Carolina had a policy 
mandating a statewide cap of 100 charter schools during the course of 
this study.  The popularity of the different choices among families 
also varies.   
 School districts might permit school choice among the schools 
within their borders for specialized academic programs and/or 
integration efforts.  For example, magnet schools focus on a particular 
content area and draw from students across the district.  These schools 
were originally designed to help voluntarily integrate students in 
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racially segregated school districts (Archbald 2004).  Magnet schools 
are typically open by application to all students in the district and 
are populated in part by neighborhood students and in part by students 
who have applied to attend the school.   
Year-round schools have been growing in popularity to combat 
summer learning loss (Entwisle and Alexander 1992; Ready 2010).  
However, not all parents are interested in the year-round school 
schedules.  Therefore, some districts populate year-round schools in a 
manner similar to magnet schools: with parents applying for admission 
as long as they reside somewhere within the school district.   
Most school districts also permit families to apply for waivers 
from their assigned schools.  For example, a family that moves 
residences between a child’s fourth and fifth grade years might request 
that their child remain in the same school for its terminal elementary 
school year.  In addition, the federal No Child Left Behind law 
provides families with the opportunity to attend a different school if 
their assigned school repeatedly does not meet student achievement 
benchmarks.  Finally, specialized programs, such as dedicated programs 
for exceptional children, academically gifted children, or rigorous 
language education, sometimes consolidate those groups of students at a 
specific school.  Students attending these specialized programs, 
therefore, might not attend their assigned schools.  Each of these 
programs provides some opportunity for students to attend a non-
assigned school.   
Motivating this dissertation chapter is the fact that families 
are not equally likely to adopt each of these choice options.  The 
following section provides a discussion about the ways in which 
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parents’ residential choices, opinions of school quality, and 
likelihood to send their children to a non-assigned public school 
differ among groups of students.  
 
1.4 The Role of Parents in Student Assignments 
Three primary bodies of literature address relevant parental 
behavior towards student assignments.  One body describes how parents 
make residential decisions, specifically as the choices relate to 
public schools.  The second addresses how parents use their social 
networks to obtain and assess information about school quality.  The 
third body explores school choice options.  In all three bodies, the 
literature clearly shows that parents who are more advantaged have the 
greatest capacity to satisfy their preferences than disadvantaged 
parents.  Taken together, parents with more income and more education 
can make strategic housing, schooling, and school choice decisions to 
generate improved educational opportunities for their children (eg. 
Parcel, Dufur, and Zito 2010; Tilly 1998).   
1.4.1 Parents make residential decisions based on 
schools 
In the United States, families with school-aged children who 
intend to use the public school system often choose homes “for the 
schools” (Holme 2002).  However, the ways parents assess what 
constitutes a “good” school varies, especially by socioeconomic status.  
When asked which factors they consider most important for choosing 
schools, most parents list academic and teacher quality (Hastings, Van 
Weelden, and Weinstein 2007; Schneider et al. 1997).  Considerable 
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evidence documents the price premium for homes assigned to schools with 
higher test scores.  Davidoff and Leigh (2008) reviewed evidence on 
housing hedonics studies from six domestic and six international quasi-
experimental studies that document the price premium for homes linked 
to better schools, as defined by test scores.  They found that a 5-
percentage point increase in test scores (approximately 1 standard 
deviation) is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in house prices.   
While parents may claim to prioritize objective academic 
superiority, the evidence suggests that many actually care more about 
the racial and socioeconomic composition of the student body (Clapp et 
al. 2008; Card and Rothstein 2007; Holme 2002; Koedel, Betts, et al. 
2009; Fossey 1994).  White families often attempt to avoid schools with 
high proportions of black students, while black families tend to favor 
schools with lower proportions of students in poverty (Saporito and 
Lareau 1999).  A study of parents’ perceptions of school quality in 
Connecticut suggests that the role of race has become more pronounced 
over time whereas the role of academic performance has declined 
(Dougherty et al. 2009).  
Advantaged families have more market power to purchase homes 
relative to disadvantaged families.  Many house price hedonic 
regression studies have demonstrated a positive association between 
school quality and housing prices (Black 1999; Figlio and Lucas 2004; 
Ries and Sommerville 2010; Dhar and Ross 2012).  Even controlling for 
differences in location by income, children from poor families in the 
United Kingdom are significantly less likely to go to good schools, 
regardless of the extent to which school choice options exist (Burgess 
and Briggs 2010).  Since residences are tied to school assignments, and 
 
18 
 
assignments generate different educational opportunities for students, 
parents who can afford to do so “vote with their feet” (Tiebout 1956) 
to enroll their students in schools they perceive to be more desirable.   
The residential decisions parents make have implications for the 
distribution of families across both neighborhoods and schools.  These 
choices lead to housing segregation (eg. Pais, South, and Crowder 
2009), and thus school segregation (eg. Bifulco, Ladd, Ross 2009; 
Lankford and Wyckoff 2006).  Even small differences in the preferences 
families have about the racial composition of their neighborhoods lead 
to large segregative effects (Schelling 1971).  Observable differences 
in schools influence perceptions of the quality of those schools, which 
in turn affect parents’ housing preferences.   
Simultaneously, the residential compositions of neighborhoods are 
related to school segregation, as school assignments are based on 
residence.  This process is cyclical and creates a positive feedback 
loop between school and housing segregation (Tauber and James 1982).  
School segregation by race in the United States is increasing.  School 
desegregation plans instituted following the landmark Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) Supreme Court decision are far less likely to still 
have court-ordered oversight.  As a result, American public schools 
across the nation, and especially in the South, have been subject to 
resegragation by race (Reardon et al. 2012).   
Perceptions of schools are not always consistent across parents 
of different subgroups.  Further, the racial preferences misalignment 
makes it impossible to sort races to satisfy the preferences of all 
groups (eg. Vigdor 2003).  The segregating choices made by wealthier 
families are most likely to trump the integrating choices made by 
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disadvantaged families (Bifulco, Ladd, and Ross 2009).  This chapter 
takes residential choices and school segregation as given at a point in 
time and emphasizes the school choices families make in light of these 
residential preferences and school quality patterns.   
1.4.2 Parents obtain information about schools through 
their social networks 
 
The homophily principle holds that people have personal networks 
that are largely homogenous (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  
This homogeneity limits information gathering to the views of people 
most similar to oneself.  For example, attorneys are more likely to 
know other attorneys than welders and welders are more likely to know 
other welders than attorneys.  While the personal networks of 
individuals from different social classes are likely to vary in 
composition, advantaged families are additionally more likely than 
disadvantaged families to know or at least have access to a wider 
variety of people (Granovetter 1973).  For example, welders are likely 
to know and interact with electricians and contractors, but not 
professors; lawyers are likely to have direct contact with a much more 
diverse set of clients, including other highly educated professions, 
service employees, and welders alike.  Consequently, the total 
information available to an individual naturally differs by his or her 
class (Bosetti 2004).  This broad reach of social networks is often 
referred to as “extensity” in the social capital literature, and is 
contingent upon initial positions in the social hierarchy (Lin 1999, 
2001).  Further, individuals privilege information learned through 
their social networks over the information provided by schools (Ball 
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1998).  Based on these theories, advantaged families are likely to have 
more information about school quality and school choices than 
disadvantaged families.   
These social networks can provide greater opportunities for 
advantaged families to learn about the quality of different schools.  
In her summary of the literature on parents’ social capital in school 
choices, Bell (2009) details both the use of social networks to obtain 
school information, and the unevenness in these networks for families 
of different socioeconomic status.  For example, the hypothetical 
lawyer described above is more likely than the welder to know 
individuals who can help access and interpret test score data online, 
have connections to a teacher or principal who can provide perspective 
on the quality of local schools, and have a realtor who can direct them 
towards or away from certain neighborhoods according to the school 
quality.   
Transactions costs (Coase 1960) to learn about and understand 
school quality differences are substantial.  Social networks play a 
substantively meaningful role in the residential choices of families.  
Hompohily and social capital differences drive the different 
information gathering procedures for advantaged and disadvantaged 
families.  In turn, these differences produce varying abilities for 
families to access and understand information about general school 
quality and about school choice options (Hastings and Weinstein 2008; 
Schneider et al. 1997; Epple and Romano 1998).  The limited social 
networks among disadvantaged families imply that the most disadvantaged 
families likely neither have the same access to information, nor the 
resources to opt out of their assigned schools.  Therefore, school 
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assignment noncompliance can be considered a lower-bound estimate for 
their displeasure with school assignments.   
1.4.3 Some Parents make school choice decisions 
Those parents with the financial and social capital to do so make 
school choices for their children at several decision points.  First, 
parents choose where to live.  Second, some families seek school choice 
options.  This process takes considerable knowledge to know the 
options, evaluate their potential, and apply to the specific school 
program.  Third, families often need additional resources to enroll in 
choice programs.  For example, many charter schools do not bus children 
to schools, so parents of charter school students are responsible for 
providing school transportation.  Also, year-round school breaks may 
not align with subsidized child care or enrichment programs.  Working 
parents of year-round students must be able to find and afford the 
child care options that occur during the additional school breaks.   
School choice decisions vary by student achievement (Bifulco, 
Ladd, Ross 2009), socioeconomic status (Brunner & Imazeki 2008), and 
race (Lankford and Wyckoff 2006; Renzulli and Evans 2005).  What whites 
choose versus what blacks choose differs (eg. Saporito and Lareau 
1999).  White families are more likely to choose private schools 
(Fairlie and Resch 2002; Figlio & Stone 2001; Lankford, Lee, Wyckoff 
1995; Reardon & Yun 2002; Saporito 2003) and other school choice 
programs (Hastings, Kane, Staiger 2005; Saporito 2003).  Affluent white 
families tend to transfer schools without moving homes (Renzulli and 
Evans 2005).  Researchers found that black families in North Carolina 
are more likely to favor charter school in urban areas and those that 
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target at-risk students (Bifulco and Ladd 2007).  The result of all of 
these choices is that “poor and minority children are much more 
concentrated in high-poverty public schools than they would be if all 
children attended their local schools” (Saporito and Sohoni 2007).   
 
1.5 Data  
 
This chapter focuses on North Carolina, a large state with 
substantial variation across its 100 counties and 115 school districts 
in terms of size, population density, student composition, and 
population growth.  It is therefore a useful location for case studies 
on educational topics that can have different impacts in urban, rural, 
and suburban locales.   
The data for this paper derive from diverse sources at the school 
district, school, and student levels.  I integrated detailed student-
level administrative records with information on students’ geographic 
school assignments for a subset of North Carolina school districts, 
schools, and students from 2003/4 to 2009/10.  Together, these data 
form a unique and extremely rich and granular database at both the 
district- and student-level.   
1.5.1 Student Data 
The North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) at the 
Child and Family Policy Center at Duke University maintains 
longitudinal, multilevel, administrative records on all North Carolina 
public school students, schools, and school districts.  Individual 
student records contain information such as race, ethnicity, gender, 
participation in the federal free and reduced price lunch (FRL) subsidy 
 
23 
 
program, Limited English Proficiency (LEP) status, and standardized 
End-of-Grade (EOG) test scores in math and reading.  These covariates 
are included in all models in this and future chapters.   
Most elementary schools are configured from kindergarten through 
fifth or sixth grade, making the transition from third to fourth grade 
one that generally occurs within the same school.  Because students and 
parents in third and fourth grades anticipated remaining in the same 
school between years, these grades represent a stable time in students’ 
schooling where no school choice decision needs to be made.  Third and 
fourth grade students are the research subjects in the chapter because 
of the expected stability of students’ educational environments 
afforded by elementary school grade configurations.   
The residential data used in this chapter are extremely granular.  
In North Carolina, the Institute for Transportation Research in 
Education (ITRE) at North Carolina State University serves as 
clearinghouse for all school districts to use when designing bus 
routes.  Since school buses must take students from their home to their 
assigned schools, ITRE has information on where each public school 
student in the state resides at the beginning of each school year.  
ITRE provides these exact student addresses to the NCERDC.  As a 
consequence, data in this chapter on student residential location are 
exact home addresses.  At the NCERDC, the student data are coded with 
the same unique student identifier as in the other administrative 
records by linking students’ names, social security numbers, and 
birthdates.  I used ArcGIS software to geocode the de-identified 
individual student addresses.  Thereafter, I linked the individual 
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students to their school assignments, which I derived from districts’ 
school assignment maps.   
1.5.2 School Data 
School data are derived from the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Common Core of Data.  These data contain basic demographic 
information about schools, such as their location, sizes, racial 
compositions, percentage of students performing on standardized tests 
at or above grade level, and the percent of poor students in each 
school.   
1.5.3 School District Data 
School districts in North Carolina are generally coterminous with 
counties, which makes them large.  I collected and compiled a set of 
longitudinal school attendance boundary maps for elementary schools 
from select districts and years described in the following subsection.  
These maps are in the form of shapefiles.  This data format is 
advantageous over paper maps because shapefiles have incorporated the 
projection from 2-dimension maps to the spherical geometry of the 
earth.  Address data can therefore be reliably linked to maps in this 
format using geographic statistical software, unlike paper maps.   Five 
of these district maps come from ITRE and its affiliate, the Operations 
Research and Education Laboratory (OR/Ed).  To increase the number of 
cases in the sample, I searched for additional school districts in the 
state that had high NCERDC-ITRE match rates and that had maps in 
shapefile format available from an alternative source.  The Durham 
County School District has retained historical shapefiles of student 
assignments and the district also had a high administrative student 
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data and address data match rate.  Therefore, I supplemented the sample 
with this school district to make six districts in total.   
 
1.6 Sample Selection 
Specific districts at specific points in time were chosen for 
their utility in addressing the research questions posed by this 
chapter.  Most obviously, districts were selected for altering student 
assignment plans at some point during the time evaluated (for analyses 
in future chapter).  Further, data were selected for quality.  First, 
because of imperfect matching of ITRE and NCERDC records, only a subset 
of student assignment maps were geocoded with sufficient data to be 
reliable; these tended to occur in the later years of the NCERDC panel.  
Similarly, ITRE and OR/ED were selected when data in consecutive years 
were available.   
1.6.1 School Districts in Sample 
Since North Carolina’s population is growing, the most common 
reassignment plans in the state occur when a district opens a new 
school to accommodate a population increase.  I therefore chose to 
focus on counties that have grown in recent years.  Together, the 
convenience sample of the districts and years is depicted in Figure 3 
and detailed in Table 1.  
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  Figure 3: County Map of North Carolina 
Table 1: School districts and years in the sample  
Schl Years Brunswick Durham Harnett 
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Onslow 
 
Union 
2003/4 & 
2004/5 X    X 
 
X 
2004/5 & 
2005/6 
 
X   X 
 
2005/6 & 
2006/7 
 
X   X 
 
2006/7 & 
2007/8 
 
X X X X 
 
2007/8 & 
2008/9 
 
X X X  
 
2008/9 & 
2009/10 
 
X  X  
 
2009/10 & 
2010/11    X  
 
*Note: These are districts and years for which I have geographic boundaries in 
consecutive years and in which at least 60 percent of the students have address 
data.  
 
The 6 counties in the sample are diverse in location, size, 
growth, and demographic composition.  These districts all grew at 
faster rates than the national average, yet they still varied in rate 
of growth, minority composition, and levels of education, income, and 
poverty.  Table 2 provides detailed information on the county 
demographics and population growth for each school district in the 
sample.  Brunswick County is on the southeastern coast of North 
Carolina.  It is part of the Wilmington Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
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and is the 37th fastest-growing county in the United States4.  Durham 
County is home to Durham, and to Duke University.  Harnett County is 
adjacent to Wake County, in which the state capital, Raleigh, is 
located.  Mecklenburg County contains Charlotte and is both the most 
populated and the densest county in the state.  It is the center of the 
Charlotte Metropolitan Statistical Area.  Union County borders 
Mecklenburg County.  Onslow County is on the coast and contains the 
Jacksonville Metropolitan Statistical Area.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4 http://www.brunswickedc.com/ 
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Table 2: Descriptive Information about Counties in Sample    
 
School 
District in 
Sample 
2010 
population 
2000-10 
% pop 
growth  
2010 % 
White 
2010 % 
Black 
2010 % 
Latino 
2006-10 
% >25yrs 
with 
college 
degree 
2006-10 
Median 
HH 
Income 
 2006-10 
% below 
poverty 
Brunswick 107,431 46.9 83.0 11.4 5.2 23.4 $45,806  13.5 
Durham 267,587 19.8 46.4 38 13.5 44.1 $49,894  16.1 
Harnett 114,678 26 68.3 20.9 10.8 16.0 $42,853  16.5 
Mecklenburg 919,628 32.2 55.3 30.8 12.2 40.0 $55,294  12.5 
Onslow 177,772 18.2 74.0 15.6 10.1 17.7 $43,561  13.8 
Union 210,292 62.8 79 11.7 10.4 29.1 $63,368  8.5 
North Carolina 9,656,401 18.5 68.5 21.5 8.4 26.1 $45,570  15.5 
USA 311,591,917 9.7 72.4 12.6 16.3 27.9 $51,914  13.8 
 
Source: United States Census Bureau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Private school enrollments vary within these districts, as seen 
in Table 3.  In the fall of 2007, about 7.2 percent of elementary 
school students in the United States attended private schools5.  The two 
largest districts in this sample, Mecklenburg county and Durham County 
have private school enrolments comparable to the national average.  The 
other four districts have private school enrolments far below the 
national average.  Since the vast majority of school-age children in 
these districts attend public schools, school district policies are 
particularly relevant for the children in these districts.  Of note, in 
addition to private school options, each district in the sample 
provides some opportunity for school choice within the public school 
system. 
Table 3: Students in private schools, select years 
County Year (spring) 
# students in 
grades 3 or 4 in 
private schools 
# students 
in grades 3 
or 4 in NC 
admin data 
% private 
Brunswick 2004 57 2,795 2.0 
Durham 2009 742 8,689 7.9 
Harnett 2009 66 4,673 1.4 
Mecklenburg 2010 3,003 35,187 7.9 
Onslow 2007 165 5,648 2.8 
Union 2005 192 8,791 2.1 
Source of private school data: North Carolina Division of Non-Public 
Instruction  
1.6.2 Schools 
Schools in the sample have different grade configurations, as 
detailed in Table 4.  By far, the most common configuration is 
elementary schools that start in kindergarten or pre-kindergarten and 
5 http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_038.asp 
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go through the fifth grade.  A few schools in the sample combine 
elementary and middle grades or combine elementary, middle, and high 
school grades.  This chapter addresses students in non-promotional 
grades.  Therefore, students in the fourth grade of the KG-4 school 
were omitted from analyses.  All other schools in the sample extend 
beyond fourth grade.  Students in grades 3 and 4 in each school are 
included in the sample.   
Table 4: Grade Configuation of Sample Schools 
  # Schools in Sample 
PK or KG through 5th Grade 162 
3rd Grade6 through 5th 
Grade 4 
4th Grade through 5th Grade 2 
KG through 8th Grade 1 
KG through 4th Grade  1* 
*The 4th grade cohort in this school was dropped from the sample 
 
Nearly all of the schools in this sample are traditional public 
schools.  A small number of the schools in these school districts are 
schools of choice.  Table 5 reports the number of students in the 
sample districts that attend charter, magnet, and year-round schools.  
Charter schools in North Carolina are independent of the traditional 
school districts and all students attending charter schools have chosen 
that school over a traditional public school7.  Magnet and year-round 
6 Although these third graders (and the fourth graders in the two 4-5 schools) 
are in a promotional grade, the following year, they will not need to change 
schools due to a promotion.  Given the purpose and future sampling needs of 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation, these third graders are included in the 
sample. Sensitivity analyses that omit these students do no not alter the 
results.   
7 It is possible that these charter school students do not reside in the 
traditional public school district identified.  In North Carolina, charter 
schools are independent school districts.  The charter schools identified in 
this sample, while distinct from the Local Education Agencies in the sample, 
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schools have a combination of students assigned to those schools along 
with a group of students who have chosen those schools over their 
assigned neighborhood school option.  Durham and Mecklenburg Counties 
have the greatest number of students in choice schools.  Harnett County 
has no explicit choice school options.   
Table 5: Charter, Magnet, and Year Round School Enrollments by 
District (all years), in sample 
District (2004-2010 aggregated) Charter Students 
Magnet 
Students 
Year Round 
Students 
Brunswick 86 -  412 
Durham 2,300 349 3,004 
Harnett  - -  - 
Mecklenburg 2,762 6,698 45 
Onslow -  -  43 
Union 239 -  871 
 
1.6.3 Students 
As noted earlier, not all student addresses can be linked to the 
NCERDC administrative educational records.  In these cases, the cause 
for the absence of addresses in the administrative data cannot be 
ascertained, although several causes are possible.  First, and most 
probable, there might have been insufficient individual-level data from 
ITRE on which to match students to the administrative data.  Second, 
the ITRE data is gathered in the fall of the academic year whereas 
other demographic and academic data are gathered from spring End-of-
are assigned to the traditional public school district if the school location 
falls within the geographic boundaries of that district.  Since these charter 
schools are located within the borders of the sample school districts, these 
analyses assume that the students attending those charter schools reside in the 
school district and would otherwise have attended a traditional public school 
in that district in the absence of the charter school.  
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Grade exams.  Third, it is possible that students who do not use buses 
to get to school are missing from the ITRE data.   
Among the students who do have geographic data, over 98 percent 
of the addresses in the NCERDC data can be geocoded and linked to the 
geographic attendance data.  The most common reason for unmatched 
addresses is that some zip codes contain multiple streets with the same 
name.  In these cases, the geocoding process cannot distinguish between 
identically named streets.  Table 6 provides match rates for districts 
in some of the later years each district is in the panel.  About 79 to 
95 percent of students in these districts have address data.  Since 
some student addresses are missing, I test (see Appendix A) whether 
these missing cases would bias the results and weight all models to 
account for these differences.   
Table 6: Details about geocoded data, in sample 
County 
School Years 
(spring) 
# students in 
grades 3 or 4 
in NC admin 
data 
# students in 
grades 3 or 4 
with matched 
address data % match 
Brunswick 2004 1,774 1,530 86.2 
Durham 2005-2009 22,793 20,980 92.0 
Harnett 2007-2008 3,925 3,190 81.3 
Mecklenburg 2010 53,643 49,813 92.9 
Onslow 2007 13,141 12,021 91.5 
Union 2007 5,478 4,851 88.6 
 
Indicators representing students’ assignments as urban, suburban, 
or rural are derived from the National Center for Education Statistic’s 
urban-centric coding scheme that describes a school’s location relative 
to an urbanized area.  I collapsed the 12 urban-centric codes into 
three categories: urban, suburban (which includes all suburban and town 
classifications) and rural.  Of note, the geographic indicators are 
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based on the school location to which a student is assigned rather than 
her address.  Given the relatively small size of most elementary school 
catchment areas, schools of a given geographic classification should 
draw students predominantly from that geographic type.  All sample 
districts have both suburban and rural schools.  Half of the sample 
districts include urban, suburban, and rural schools and the other half 
include only rural and suburban schools.   
Table 7: Percentage of Students in Assigned to Schools of 
Different Geographic Classifications 
School 
District 
Number 
of 
Students 
Urban School 
Assignments 
(%) 
Suburban 
Assignments 
(%) 
Rural 
Assignments 
(%) 
Brunswick 1,774 0.0 28.2 71.8 
Durham 22,793 74.9 6.2 18.9 
Harnett 3,918 0.0 28.9 71.1 
Mecklenburg 53,643 62.8 22.8 14.4 
Onslow 13,141 27.6 39.0 33.4 
Union 5,478 0.0 27.2 72.8 
  
Table 8 provides summary demographic statistics for all the 
students in the sample.  White students comprise about 40 percent of 
the sample, and black students comprise 36 percent.  Nearly half (47 
percent) of the students are of low-socioeconomic student status, 
defined in this and future chapters as being eligible for free (family 
income is below 130 percent of the poverty line) or reduced price 
(family income is less than 185 percent of the poverty line) lunch.   
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Table 8: Whole Sample Characteristics  
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Student Variables    
White 100,747 0.41 0.49 
Black 100,747 0.38 0.48 
Latino 100,747 0.13 0.33 
Asian 100,747 0.03 0.17 
Multi, Other, or Missing Race 100,747 0.06 0.24 
Free or Reduced Price Lunch Eligible 100,747 0.46 0.50 
Standardized Math End of Grade Score 100,747 -0.02 1.02 
Missing Math EOG Score Indicator 100,747 0.03 0.17 
Limited English Proficient (LEP) 100,747 0.10 0.29 
Missing LEP Indicator 100,747 0.00 0.05 
Female 100,747 0.50 0.50 
Old for Grade 100,747 0.16 0.36 
Missing Birthday 100,747 0.03 0.16 
Third Grade 100,747 0.49 0.50 
Fourth Grade 100,747 0.51 0.50 
        
Type of School Assignment       
Assigned to Urban School 100,747 0.54 0.50 
Assigned to Suburban or Town School 100,747 0.22 0.41 
Assigned to Rural School 100,747 0.24 0.43 
        
District Variable       
Lagged 5-year District Student 
Population Growth 100,747 3.23 1.84 
 
Over 85 percent of the students in the sample have address data 
that could be matched to school assignments.  Not correcting for the 
differences between the students who do and do not have geocoded data 
could introduce a source of bias.  To identify these potential 
differences, I ran a logistic regression to predict whether a student 
in the administrative data also has geographic data present.  The 
dependent variable in this model is a binary indicator for whether a 
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student has an address in the data and is a function of a vector of 
individual student characteristics, the lagged 5-year total student 
population growth in the district, and fixed effects for the district, 
grade, and year of the observation in the following form:  
   
Log� 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎
1−(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎)� =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  
                                           𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. 
 
Individual-level covariates include student race (White is the 
reference group and other race options are Black, Latino, Asian, 
Multi/Other), FRL (the reference group is not poor), the geography of 
the school to which a student was assigned (City is the reference 
groups, and the other geography options are suburb and rural), the main 
effects, interactions, and triple interactions of race, FRL, and 
geography, a students’ standardized math test score, indicators for 
having limited English proficiency (LEP), female, and old for grade 
(defined as having a birthdate after the cutoff for students in that 
grade and year).  Appendix A contains the logistic regression results.   
As results are odds ratios, a value less than one indicates a lower 
probability than the reference group of having address data and an odds 
ratio greater than one a higher likelihood of having address data.   
Students who are FRL Eligible, black, assigned to suburban and 
rural schools, LEP, and higher standardized math test scores are more 
likely to be geocoded than non-poor, white, urban, non-LEP, and lower 
math performance students.  Students less likely to be geocoded include 
all other minority groups, old-for-grade, and many of the nonwhite 
suburban/town, nonwhite rural, poor suburban/town, and poor rural 
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student interaction subgroups.  While several odds ratios from this 
model were statistically significant, results are not consistent across 
either advantaged or disadvantaged student groups.  Therefore, there is 
no evidence of systematic bias in the sample with matched address data.  
Nonetheless, I have subsequently weighted all subsequent models in this 
chapter and dissertation to correct for the differential likelihood 
students are to have address data.  Using predicted values from this 
model, future models are weighted by the inverse of the likelihood that 
a student in the NCERDC data sample also has address data.   
 
1.7 What types of students are most likely to opt 
out of their traditional public school assignments: 
Methods and Results 
This section now addresses the chapter’s primary research 
questions.  Table 9 provides summary information about the public 
school types attended by the students who do and do not comply with 
their school assignments in a given year.  In total, 32 percent of the 
sample does not follow their assignment.   
Table 9: Types of public schools attended by compliers and non- 
compliers with school assignments 
 
Compliers    
(n=64,715)  
Non-Compliers 
(n=30,158) 
Type of School Attended Mean Std. Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Magnet School 0.07 0.26 
 
0.35 0.48 
Charter School 0 0 
 
0.18 0.38 
Year-Round School 0.03 0.18  0.07 0.25 
Non-charter, non-
magnet, non-year round 
public school 0.9 0.3  0.41 0.49 
 
37 
 
 
To determine the characteristics of students who do not attend 
their assigned schools, I run a basic logistic regression of the 
following form:  
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)� =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
 
Where DnC (0/1) refers to whether a student “Does not Comply” with her 
school assignment.   
 
This model is weighted by the inverse likelihood a student has 
address and assignment data in consecutive years according to the prior 
regression.  Past literature indicates race, socioeconomic status, and 
students’ academic abilities can contribute to the school choice 
decisions families make.  To determine whether any of these factors 
contribute to parents’ decisions not to follow their school assignment, 
analyses in this chapter include the following individual-level 
covariates: student race, FRL, the geography of the school to which a 
student was assigned, a students’ standardized math test score, 
indicators for being LEP, female, and old for grade (defined as having 
a birthdate after the cutoff for students in that grade and year).  
Included in these predictions are charter school students, who are 
coded as non-compliers since they attend a choice school rather than 
their assigned school.  Charter school students do not have address 
data, so for this analysis, they are coded as residing in the nearest 
traditional school district.  For example, although it is possible that 
Mecklenburg charter students reside in an adjacent county, the analyses 
presented here assume that they are Mecklenburg County residents.  
Whether charter students are assigned to an urban, suburban, or rural 
school is based on the NCES code for the charter school’s location.  
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Ideally, the student address would have been used but in the absence of 
that data, the fact that most charter students preference for that 
school is stronger when it is closer (Bifulco and Ladd 2007) justifies 
the imputation using the location of the charter school as students’ 
residence.  The logistic regression results for all of the independent 
variables can be found in Appendix A. 
The following figures display the predicted probability of 
attending a non-assigned public school.  Figure 4 demonstrates the 
differences by school district.  Next are the main effects by 
geography, race, and free or reduced price lunch eligibility. 
 Figure 4: Weighted Predicted Probability of Noncompliance with 
School Assignments, by School District 
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 The degree of noncompliance with school assignments clearly 
varies across school districts.  Durham and Mecklenburg Counties have 
the most school choice options available in their counties; thus, it is 
not surprising to see high rates of noncompliance with school 
assignments (40 and 29 percent, respectively) in these districts.  
These two counties also have the highest percentage of students 
attending private schools.  Charter and magnet students are not the 
only drivers of noncompliance; Harnett County has no charter, magnet, 
or year-round students, yet 18 percent of Harnett County third and 
fourth graders do not comply with their school assignments.  These 
large differences across school district motivate the decision to 
include district fixed effects in all future models, for district-level 
idiosyncrasies in the availability and use of choice options clearly 
vary. 
 Figure 5 presents predicted probabilities by select covariates 
(assigned school geography, race, and FRL status) from the general 
noncompliance model.  Over one-third of students assigned to urban 
schools in this sample do not actually attend their assigned schools.  
This rate is higher than and statistically different from both suburban 
and rural noncompliance.  Many more school choice options exist for 
urban students and many take advantage of them.  Many of these families 
likely could not afford a home with a more desirable school assignment, 
and as a result, have selected to opt out of their school assignment.  
This revealed behavior implies that many urban families are more 
content with alternate schools over their assigned schools.  
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By race, 38 percent of black students and 26 percent of Latino 
students do not comply with assignments.  Only 17 percent of white 
students do not attend their assigned schools.  The predicted 
probabilities for these three groups are statistically different from 
each other.  This finding demonstrates that many minority families are 
not content with their assignments and a sizeable share are willing and 
able to act on that displeasure.  Presumably, these families are using 
the school choice options available in light of their choice or 
inability to live in a more desirable school catchment area.  Poor 
students (28%) are statistically more likely than non-poor students 
(24%) not to comply with their school assignments.   
 Figure 5: Weighted Predicted Probability of Noncompliance with 
School Assignments, by Geography of School Assignment, Student 
Race, and FRL Eligibility 
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The large differences and statistically significant patterns 
across geography and race motivate an additional set of interactive 
models.  The next two figures demonstrate the statistically significant 
interactive differences for the following two models.  These models 
predict whether a student “Does not Comply” (DnC), include the same 
student characteristics as the former model, and also introduce 
interactions between geography and race: 
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)� =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,   
 
 
and geography and FRL status: 
 
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)� =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 +  𝜷𝟒 ∗
𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.   
 
 
Figure 6 depicts the weighted predicted probabilities of not 
attending the assigned school for the geography * race interactive 
model.   
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  Figure 6: Weighted Predicted Probability of Noncompliance with 
School Assignments, by Geography*Race Interactions 
Among all racial groups, there is more noncompliance in urban 
areas than the in both suburbs and rural areas.  In fact, urban 
students of all races area more likely to attend a non-assigned school 
than non-black suburban and non-black rural students.  In both suburban 
and rural areas, white students are less likely not to comply than are 
black or Latino students.  These findings support the original pattern 
in which urban and black families are inferred to be more content with 
some alternate school choice option relative to the neighborhood school 
to which they are assigned according to their residence.   
Figure 7 illustrates the predicted probabilities of noncompliance 
for the geography * FRL interactions.  The original non-interactive 
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model produced statistically significant predicted probabilities in 
which poor students were more likely than non-poor students not to 
comply.  By geography and poverty, the only statistically significant 
differences emerge in rural schools.  Non-poor rural students are more 
likely than poor rural students to attend a non-assigned school.  Urban 
students remain nearly twice as likely as suburban or rural students to 
attend a non-assigned school.  These striking differences in opt out 
choices between urban and non-urban students again underpins two 
important points: (1) more school choice options are available to urban 
students and they often take advantage of them, and (2) many suburban 
and urban students may have not have as great an incentive to revise 
their school selection beyond selecting a residence linked to a 
preferred school.   
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  Figure 7: Weighted Predicted Probability of Noncompliance with 
School Assignments, by Geography*FRL Interactions 
 
Next, I extend the models beyond merely predicting noncompliance 
to delineate the choices as being to explicit school choices versus to 
nonassigned traditional public schools.  I use a multinomial 
regression, where the reference outcome is attending one’s assigned 
school.  Noncompliance subtypes include school choice options (charter, 
magnet, year-round) and other non-assigned traditional public schools.  
Main effect patterns for students attending explicit schools of choice 
largely mirror those of overall noncomplince and can be found in 
Appendix A8.   
8 The largest difference with overall noncompliance is the lower likelihood of 
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To identify the interactive patterns by both geography and 
socioeconomic status, I run a weighted multinomial logistic regression 
of the following form and present the results in Figure 8: 
Log�𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑜𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) � = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 +    𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
 
 
Log�𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) � =                                        𝛽0  + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛼𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.           
 
Among students who are assigned to urban schools, both poor and 
non-poor students are more likely to attend schools of choice than non-
assigned traditional public schools.  These urban students have access 
to school choice options and often take them.  Both rural poor and 
rural non-poor students are more likely to attend schools of choice 
than traditional schools relative to their same-SES rural peers.  Among 
suburban students, low SES students are far more likely to attend non-
assigned traditional public schools than schools of choice.  Overall, 
the lowest predicted noncompliance is among suburban poor to schools of 
choice and rural non-poor to non-assigned traditional public schools.  
Findings suggest non-poor families, despite having greater residential 
have about a 13% likelihood to attend these explicit schools of choice.  Poor 
and urban students have more school choice options and sometimes take them.  
Still, non-poor families, in addition to exercising residential choice, also 
take advantage of their school choice options.  What differs in the main effect 
models is the low likelihood among suburban students and high likelihood among 
rural students to attend a non-assigned traditional public school.  In 
addition, poor students are far more likely than non-poor students to attend a 
non-assigned traditional public schoool.   
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freedom, are still more likely to take advantage of explicit school 
choices than non-poor families.  Presumably, some of these families 
intended to send their children to a school of choice when they chose 
their home, since they likely could have afforded a home in a different 
school attendance zone.   
 Figure 8: Weighted Predicted Probability of School Assignment 
Noncompliance Types by Geography * FRL Interactions 
Considerable evidence suggests that schools would be more 
integrated if students attended their assigned schools rather than 
private, charter, or magnet schools (eg. Saporito and Sohoni 2006).  
However, less attention has been paid to the students who still attend 
traditional public schools that are not their assigned schools.  For 
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this sample, I compare the dissimilarly indices9 by school district 
according to students’ school assignments and the actual schools they 
attend.  A dissimilarity index is one technique to measure segregation.  
In this case, it captures the percent of white students who would need 
to switch schools in order for all schools to be racially balanced.  I 
also report segregation by socioeconomic status.  Overall, the sample 
of schools would be more integrated by both race and FRL status if all 
students attended their assigned schools.  While the degree of 
segregation varies by district (Table 10), this pattern holds for both 
race and SES.   
The third column of Table 10 treats students who attend a non-
assigned, non-explicit choice school as attending their assigned 
schools.  In so doing, it calculates dissimilarity indices as though 
only the students attending schools of choice are opting out of their 
assignments.  As most researchers do not have access to address and 
school assignment data, this calculation aims to determine how close 
the calculated segregation indices are when these non-explicit school 
choice decisions are not incorporated properly into segregation 
calculations.  The results demonstrate nearly identical findings with 
the correct attribution of noncompliance.  Therefore, it appears the 
increased school segregation is driven more by student attending 
explicit schools of choice than by opting out of assignments for other 
traditional public schools.   
9 Of note, dissimilarity indices are highly correlated with exposure indices 
(Massey and Denton 1988; Massey, White, and Phua 1996).   
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Table 10: Dissimilarity indices by Race 
County 
If all 
Students 
Complied 
Based on 
actually 
noncompliance 
If schools of choice 
only were accounted 
as noncompliance 
Brunswick 0.26 0.27 0.27 
Durham 0.42 0.50 0.46 
Harnett 0.15 0.17 0.17 
Mecklenburg 0.59 0.60 0.60 
Onslow 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Union 0.45 0.46 0.46 
 
Table 11 presents dissimilarity indices for urban, suburban, and 
rural schools for both race and FRL.  These findings demonstrate that 
schools in each geographic type would be more integrated by race if all 
students attended their assigned schools.  Urban and suburban schools 
would also be more integrated by SES if all students attended their 
assigned schools.  However, rural schools are more integrated by SES in 
light of the school choices families make than they would be if all 
students attended their assigned schools.   
Table 11: Dissimilarity indices by Race and FRL Status, by 
geography 
 White-Nonwhite Comparison 
FRL-non-FRL 
Comparison 
Where 
students 
allocated 
in Calcs. 
Assign
ments 
Actual 
School 
Assign
ments 
Actual 
School 
Urban  .52 .56 .46 .48 
Suburban .58 .50 .33 .46 
Rural  .46 .49 .43 .36 
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1.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
The objectives of this chapter were to introduce the dataset, to 
identify the overall rate of school assignment noncompliance across 
student subgroups, and to use the revealed parent decision to make 
inferences about how content families are with their neighborhood 
schools.  Since families do not all comply with school assignments, 
these revealed preferences for non-assigned schools are treated in this 
chapter as a reflection of the lower bound estimate of parents’ 
discontent with the school assignment.  The results are relevant for 
policy-makers both because they provide suggestive evidence about 
several correlates with parental dissatisfaction and also because the 
result of noncompliance with school assignments is that schools are 
more segregated by race and SES than in the absence of the choices.    
In total, over 1/3 of urban and black students do not comply with 
their assignments and over 45 percent of urban black students do not 
attend their assigned schools.  These high rates of noncompliance are 
substantively meaningful.  At least among this sample, it seems quite 
clear that many families are not pleased with their assignments, which 
motivates them to send their children to a different public school.   
It should come as no surprise that districts with explicit choice 
options have many students engaging in school choice options.  Charter, 
magnet, and year-round schools are designed to increase choice options, 
and they serve that function.  In addition to these high rates of 
noncompliance by attending schools of choice, many students attend non-
assigned traditional public school that are non-explicit schools of 
choice.  In this sample, over 10 percent of students attend a non-
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assigned traditional public school.  Sample districts were selected for 
having longitudinal, historical school attendance maps available and 
for enacting a school reassignment policy change during the study.  
These inclusion criteria likely do not contribute to these findings 
about noncompliance to a non-assigned traditional public school.  
Nonetheless, since these non-assignments are often case-by-case 
decisions at the discretion of the school district, it would be 
valuable to extend this research with a qualitative study to 
investigate the specific procedures for requesting different 
assignments.  In so doing, it will be possible to both determine the 
extent to which the results can be extrapolated to other school 
districts and states, and to determine whether opportunities to attend 
a non-assigned school vary across observably different groups of 
students.    
The results also demonstrate clear and substantively different 
patterns of students attending their non-assigned schools according to 
geography.  Urban students are least likely to attend their assigned 
schools.  Only about 55 percent of urban, black students in this sample 
actually attended their assigned schools.  Most obviously, these 
patterns demonstrate that many parents--including nearly half of 
parents in some student subgroups--are more content with an alternate 
school over their assigned school.  Of note, address data provide 
residential student locations in the fall, while students’ school of 
record are identified in the spring.  Thus, it is possible that within-
year student mobility confounds some of the findings, particularly for 
highly mobile urban students.   
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Urban poor and non-poor students are more likely to attend an 
explicit school of choice than a non-assigned public school.  Magnet 
schools and other schools of choice are more commonly located in urban 
areas, so these school choices are more easily available to urban 
students.  Non-poor students are more likely than their poor peers to 
attend an explicit school of choice.  This finding is driven by the 
noncompliance among suburban and rural non-poor families selecting 
explicit schools of choice at higher rates than the poor students in 
the suburbs and rural areas.  Even though parents of suburban and rural 
families may have paid a housing premium for those locations, those 
families remain able to opt out of their school assignments and into 
explicit schools of choice.     
Of all student subgroups, suburban poor students are the least 
likely group to attend a school of choice.  This finding can either 
indicate that poor families who are able to live in the suburbs are 
pleased with the school options; alternatively, these poor suburban 
students might not be as connected to the necessary information and 
processes to attend a non-assigned school.  The fact that non-poor 
suburban students are far more likely (12 versus 8 percent) than poor 
suburban students to attend an explicit school of choice likely 
suggests that the more advantaged suburban families are better equipped 
than the poor suburban parents to act on their school preferences.   
The final function of this chapter is to motivate the next two 
chapters that study student reassignment.  The following chapter will 
use the sample of students in this chapter who comply with their 
assignments.  It will identify which students are reassigned when 
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districts alter their school attendance zones.  The final dissertation 
chapter will continue to investigate the reassigned student subset to 
identify families’ behavioral responses to reassignment.   
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Chapter 2: What Types of Students are most 
Likely to be Reassigned? 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies the types of students most likely to be 
reassigned when school districts enact reassignment plans.  Models in 
this chapter predict how the demographic characteristics of children 
are associated with the odds of experiencing (a) any reassignment, and 
(b) reassignment to a school of lower quality relative to students’ 
current schools.  I address these research questions by examining third 
and fourth grade students in the same sample of school districts in 
North Carolina as detailed in Chapter 1.  Results demonstrate that 
suburban non-poor students are least likely to be reassigned to any 
school or to a school of lower quality while rural non-poor students 
are the most likely student subgroup to be reassigned.  This research 
contributes to broader literature of two types.  First, social science 
literature highlights how middle class families work the education 
system to their advantage.  This research provides evidence of yet one 
more mechanism through which advantaged parents create and maintain 
better educational opportunities for their children.  Second, school 
districts serve many important functions for schools, teachers, and 
students.  This research emphasizes a common schools district policy 
that directly and substantively impacts students.   
Where families live generally determine the school assignments 
for their children.  At the time parents choose to buy or rent housing, 
most families recognize the school to which their children will be 
assigned.  The former chapter demonstrates that many families do not 
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comply with these school assignments.  In addition, these school 
assignments are not fixed.  Districts sometimes change school 
assignment plans, and not all students are equally likely to be 
reassigned.  Student reassignments are most common when schools open or 
close, as these structural changes necessitate some students to be 
reassigned to the new schools or from the closed schools.  In the last 
decade in the United States, about 31 percent of school districts grew 
annually by at least 1 percent and about 15 percent of districts shrank 
by at least 1 percent.1  While districts have little control over 
fluctuations in student populations or demographics, they must predict 
and respond to these common population changes to distribute students 
among their schools most effectively.  Reassignments sometimes also 
occur to balance student numbers or characteristics across existing 
schools.  School reassignment policies can be quite controversial. 
The controversial nature of reassignment plans is not surprising 
because there are good reasons for families to be concerned about them—
reassignments mean that children have to change schools, which can be 
disruptive, and some reassignments may be to lower quality schools.  
While district policy makers create and implement reassignments, 
certain types of families are likely to be more vocal in the decisions 
than others.  Policymakers may also make decisions intentionally to 
affect certain students more than others.   
Reassignments weaken the tie between a students’ residential 
location and the school she is assigned to attend.  This matters 
1 Author’s calculation from National Center for Education Statistics’ Common 
Core of Data for School Districts. 
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because reassignments might either ameliorate or exacerbate the 
differences in educational opportunities between students from 
advantaged and disadvantaged families.  This chapter investigates the 
characteristics of both reassigned students and the schools to which 
they are reassigned.  Reassignments affect a non-negligible portion of 
students, and the policies have the potential to generate large 
differences in educational opportunities for affected and unaffected 
students.   
Parents can influence policy in an attempt to secure the best 
opportunities for their children.  Following reassignments, parents can 
also opt out of the assignments (as was demonstrated in the former 
chapter) or move residences.  These explicit parental choices will be 
the subject of the following chapter.  This chapter uses the district 
policies and the change in relative school quality for students to make 
inferences about the level of political engagement of parents.  Since 
about 1/3 of students in the sample have already made alternate school 
choice decisions, reassignment policies are less likely to affect that 
group.  Therefore, the analyses in this chapter are restricted to the 
sample of students who complied with their initial assignment.  
Reassignment policies are particularly relevant for this group because 
their initial compliance suggests that in the absence of a policy 
change, they would be more likely to continue to attend their assigned 
schools than families who already opted out of their assigned schools.   
Findings about the likelihood and type of school reassignment 
allow inferences to be made about how involved parents are in the 
political process.  Based on the outcomes, it will be possible to make 
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inferences about who has power at the local level and who can exert 
that power to produce more advantaging student opportunities.  The 
inferences are also relevant for policymakers, for the implications 
speak to the educational opportunities available for observably 
different families.  The following chapter will explore how households 
respond to reassignment.   
 
2.2 Reassignment of Students 
School districts set assignment policies, which determine the 
schools students attend.  The fact that districts sometimes must change 
these school assignment plans is the subject of this chapter.  A 
student’s school assignment may change for three primary reasons.  
First, students can make promotional moves.  For example, when a 
student graduates from a K-5 school to a 6-8 school, she will be 
reassigned from her neighborhood elementary school to her neighborhood 
middle school.  Second, a student might move residences between years.  
These moves commonly result from upsizing or downsizing of a family 
residence, divorce, parental job loss, or they may be driven by 
parents’ concerns about school quality.  While it is possible to make a 
geographic move within the catchment area of a student’s former school, 
longer distance moves often lead to reassignment.  Third, a student 
might remain in the same residence between years yet experience 
reassignment as consequence of explicit policies enacted by school 
districts, without choice on the part of the student’s family.  This 
chapter will focus on this final type of reassignment that is caused by 
school district policies.   
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2.2.1 Reassignment Policies in Non-promotional grades 
School districts reassign students for two major reasons.  First, 
when a district grows or shrinks in population, districts may reassign 
students to avoid overcrowding or underutilization in schools affected 
by the population changes.  Second, districts may elect to open or 
close schools, which inherently requires that some students transfer 
into the new school or out of a closing school.  When reassignments are 
needed, districts may reassign students to promote balance in the 
composition of the students in schools.  Although less common than 
balancing plans for total size, districts have balanced students by 
race, socioeconomic status, and achievement.  When districts enact such 
balancing initiatives, it necessarily follows that the subset of 
students that are reassigned will be selected by some observable 
characteristic.  Before implementing new school assignments, school 
districts often provide for some public debate on the topic.  Figure 9 
demonstrates a simplified form of the process.  Based on the quality of 
the school to which a student is reassigned, inferences can be made 
about whether parents were involved in the political process to lobby 
on behalf of their children.   
        
Population 
Growth 
District Policy:  
Alter School 
Assignment Plans  
District Policy: 
Open School(s)                                                         
Inference: 
Parents’ 
Political 
Involvement 
Outcome:  
Student is 
Reassigned 
 Figure 9: Identifying Parents’ Political Involvement Based on 
School District Reassignment Outcomes 
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2.2.2 Illustrative Reassignment Policy  
Between the 2008-09 and 2009-10 school years, Union County, North 
Carolina implemented a school attendance boundary change, illustrated 
in Figure 10.  2008-09 school assignments are delineated by thick black 
lines and the colorful regions designate the 2009-10 assignments.  
While the majority of Antioch Elementary School students retained their 
assignments between years, some were reassigned to Indian Trail 
Elementary School and others were reassigned to Wesley Chapel 
Elementary School2.  Families that purchase homes likely cannot predict 
with confidence the likelihood that they will be reassigned in the 
future.  In addition, these reassignment plans only are discussed and 
decided at school board meetings in the year prior to the policy 
change.  This final plan in Union County was enacted less than 6 months 
prior to the first day of school in the next school year.  Given the 
timing of these policies, many families likely do not consider the risk 
of reassignment when they select a residence.   
2 This reassignment plan even produced a very small non-contiguous zone, 
though that is not the norm across the district.  This small, non-
contiguous area reassigned to Indian Trail Elementary school is 
substantively very different from the district-wide, purposeful 
socioeconomic balancing in school districts such as Wake County.  Thus, 
Union County Elementary Schools were not excluded from analysis in this 
chapter.   
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(http://fpc.ucps.k12.nc.us/documents/Approved_Antioch_Reassignment.pdf) 
Figure 10: Union County 2008/9-2009/10 Elementary School 
Reassignments  
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This chapter investigates such reassignment cases, using a 
subsample of school districts in North Carolina from 2003/04-2009/10.  
It examines which students are reassigned, and describes the observably 
different characteristics of reassigned versus non-reassigned students.  
Further, it focuses on reassignments of different subtypes, including 
reassignments to schools with changing relative proportions of novice 
teachers and poor students.  While there is no consensus about how to 
define changes in school quality3, this chapter describes reassignment 
subtypes as “worse” if they are to schools with more novice teachers 
and more poor students relative to students’ original schools.   
This chapter focuses on families with a strong residence-school 
link.  Similar to the former chapter, it excluded families who use 
private schools.  In addition, based on the findings from the former 
chapter, it excludes students who do not attend their assigned school4 
in the year prior to reassignment policies.  While the choices made by 
3 Education policy researchers have defined school quality in numerous ways, 
including pupil-teacher ratio, average term length, relative pay of teachers, 
test scores, parents’ education, parents’ income, school size, graduation 
rates, teacher turnover, and more.  Needless to say, there is no consensus on 
how to define school quality.  I have selected a crude, yet observable, measure 
that both advantaged and disadvantaged parents are likely to notice.    
4 Chapter 1 demonstrated that many families opt out of their school assignments.  
(The characteristics of these students can be explored in greater depth in the 
chapter.)  Although these students remain in the public school system, the fact 
that they have already made a school choice decision implies that they are more 
content with their school of record than their assigned school.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to identify parental engagement, and the relevant sample is the 
traditional public school subset of students who complied with their 
assignments.  Students who have already opted for a non-assigned public school 
are less likely to be affected by reassignments.  This chapter serves to 
document which initially compliant public school students are reassigned, 
regardless of whether they follow their assignments in the subsequent year.  
Whether students subsequently follow reassignments are addressed in the 
following chapter.   
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these families are interesting, they are outside the scope of this 
work.  
2.2.3 The role of parents in influencing school 
district reassignment policies  
Advantaged parents can be active, opinionated, and powerful 
stakeholders influencing school district decisions.  For example, 
suburbanites are likely to fight back when they perceive a threat to 
their schools (Ryan and Heise 2002).  Disadvantaged parents tend to 
have more barriers to school involvement, including less flexible work 
schedules, poor transportation options, and neighborhood stresses (Hill 
and Taylor 2004).  Further, minority immigrant parents are more likely 
than native-born parents to report more barriers to participating in 
school events (Turney and Kao 2009). 
Table 12 provides an illustrative example of voting in a local 
North Carolina school bond vote.  Only about 5 percent5 of eligible 
voters in Johnston County voted in the local school bond election in 
2005.  The voting rates by race are disproportionately higher for 
whites, so the opinions of white voters, often the more advantaged 
population subgroup, are more likely to have affected the outcome.  The 
higher engagement of whites in the school bond vote extends to other 
aspects of local school politics.  Higher income parents and white 
parents are more likely to attend school events, class events, and 
general school meetings than are poorer parents and Black or Latino 
5 In March of 2012, Johnston County had 101,342 registered voters 
(http://www.johnstonnc.com/joconcelections/).  Since I do not have precise 
information on the demographics or registered voters in Johnston County in 2005 
or 2012, I compare the 2005 voters to 2000 and 2010 decennial census totals and 
to the 2012 registered voter counts.  
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parents (U.S. Department of Education 2011).  By inference, this small 
voting minority likely exerts disproportionate influence on other 
school-related issues, such as student reassignment policies.  
 
Table 12: Illustrative NC example of local voting in 
municipal/school bond elections 
School Bond Election, 2005 Number 
% of 
local 
voters 
2000 racial 
%s in county 
2010 racial 
%s in county 
Total Number of Voters 5,705    
White Voters 4,905 0.86 0.78 0.74 
Black Voters 321 0.06 0.16 0.15 
Did not specify race 434 0.08   
     
Self-identified as Latino 4 0.00   
Not Hispanic, Not Latino 4,980 0.87   
Ethnicity not specified 721 0.13 0.08 0.13 
 
In addition to differential parental influence on district 
policies, school district policies can differentially affect parents.  
For example, some political boundaries have been gerrymandered to 
change the relative voting strength of different racial groups, most 
commonly to suppress the voice of minorities (eg. Guinier 1994; Barabas 
and Jerit 2004).  School district decisions to change school attendance 
boundaries may be seen as analogous to political gerrymandering.  
Redistricting differs from gerrymandering because gerrymandering 
affects political inputs (voters’ voices), while school redistricting 
affects outputs (access to school quality).  Similar to gerrymandering, 
redistricting has been shown to disenfranchise nonwhites and to benefit 
whites (Saito 2009), particularly in suburbia (Danielson 1976).  For 
example, numerous court findings have suggested that school boards have 
"created and altered attendance zones... in a manner which has had the 
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natural, probable and actual effect of continuing black and white 
pupils in racially segregated schools" (Wolf 1981, pp. 191).  These 
cases provide suggestive evidence of the interplay between school 
assignments and policy involvedness.  This chapter extends these 
examples to the case when these school attendance zones change.   
 
2.3 Data 
This chapter uses the same data sources and convenience sample of 
school districts and years as the former chapter (noted in Figure 2 and 
Table 1).  Given the substantive nature of these research questions, 
the new sample only includes the students who complied with their 
initial school assignments.  I use the same sampling weights I 
constructed in Chapter 1, or the inverse likelihood a student has 
address data and is in the sample in consecutive years.  Thus, the 
results can be extrapolated to all students in the sample districts.   
All districts evaluated in this sample implemented a reassignment 
plan at some time during the interval studied.  In theory, any student 
in such a district could have been reassigned.  In practice, some areas 
of a district, and therefore certain students, are more or less likely 
to be affected by reassignment.  Table 13 provides details about the 
characteristics of the students in the sample districts and years in 
the following analyses6.   
6 I also ran models using a whittled sample that included only those students 
who attended schools where some students were reassigned.  Results were 
substantively similar to what I report and I omit these details for brevity.    
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Table 13: Characteristics of sample, omitting students who did 
not comply with initial school assignments 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Student Variables    
White 64,715 0.46 0.50 
Black 64,715 0.31 0.46 
Latino 64,715 0.14 0.34 
Asian 64,715 0.03 0.18 
Multi, Other, or Missing Race 64,715 0.06 0.24 
Free or Reduced Price Lunch Eligible 64,715 0.45 0.50 
Standardized Math End of Grade Score 64,715 0.03 1.02 
Missing Math EOG Score Indicator 64,715 0.02 0.16 
Limited English Proficient 64,715 0.10 0.30 
Missing LEP Indicator 64,715 0.00 0.04 
Female 64,715 0.50 0.50 
Old for Grade 64,715 0.16 0.37 
Missing Birthday 64,715 0.02 0.15 
Third Grade 64,715 0.48 0.50 
Fourth Grade 64,715 0.52 0.50 
        
Type of School Assignment       
Assigned to Urban School 64,715 0.49 0.50 
Assigned to Suburban or Town School 64,715 0.25 0.43 
Assigned to Rural School 64,715 0.26 0.44 
        
District Variable       
Lagged 5-year District Student 
Population Growth 64,715 3.27 1.93 
 
2.3.1 Constructing reassignment variables 
To construct the reassignment indicators, I merged together 
student geographic information with district geographic maps on the 
current and the next year’s assignments.  First, I generated an 
“assigned school this year” variable based on a students’ current 
geographic location.  Given that the sample is comprised only of 
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initial compliers, this “assigned school this year” variable is 
equivalent to the students’ school of record in the year prior to 
reassignment.  Next, still using a students’ current geographic 
location, I determined her assignment the next year.  Then, I 
constructed a binary indicator to represent whether a students’ 
assignment this year differs from her assignment next year.   
 
2.4 Who is reassigned: Methods and Results 
This section turns to the primary research question.  Logistic 
regressions model the associations between reassignment and the 
observable characteristics of students.  All models include fixed 
effects for both school districts and for the students’ grade in the 
initial year to control for differences across districts and by grade.  
The models would not converge with district, grade, and year fixed 
effects, likely due to the limited nature of reassignment policies in 
some districts as being only in a single year.  As a results of the 
non-convergence, year fixed effects were omitted from the analyses in 
this chapter.   
2.4.1 General Model 
To predict whether a student is reassigned to a different school 
between years, I employed several weighted logistic regression in the 
following basic form, controlling for initial student and school 
characteristics, district growth, and district and initial grade fixed 
effects: 
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Log� 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑
1−(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑)� =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +            𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. 
 
The regression is weighted by the inverse of the probability of a 
student having matched address data and is restricted to include only 
the students who complied with their initial assignments.  By employing 
this weighting strategy, inferences from the model can be applied to 
all public school students in the sample districts.  The results from 
this model demonstrate which types of students are more likely to be 
reassigned relative to non-reassigned students.  The regression results 
from this basic, non-interactive model can be found in Appendix B.  All 
figures present weighted predicted probabilities and control for the 
entire set of covariates from the above model.  Figure 11 depicts the 
predicted probabilities of reassignment by school district.  A 
minority, but not negligible group of students is reassigned.  These 
rates of reassignment range from about 2 percent in Mecklenburg County 
to 16 percent in Brunswick and Union Counties.   
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  Figure 11: Weighted Predicted Probability of Reassignment, by 
District, 2004-2011 
Appendix B presents the predicted proximities of select main 
effects from the general model.  Interactive results by geographic 
location provide more substantively meaningful results than the main 
effects, so that model follows.  Rural areas are often at the fringe of 
a district and have fewer schools in the area than suburban and urban 
areas.  When growth leads to a new rural school, a larger proportion of 
students might be reassigned as a consequence.  Urban areas have high 
population density, which might produce a high impact of reassignment 
policies on students attending urban schools.  Suburbs are often have 
residential stability since families have moved there “for the 
schools.”  Districts might therefore attempt to accommodate population 
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fluctuations within the existing suburban schools rather than enacting 
reassignment plans that affect suburban students.  Figure 12 presents 
interactive predicted probabilities according to the geography of 
students’ assignments using an interactive model of the following form: 
Log� 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑
1−(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑)� =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 
𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 +  𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 +  𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 +   𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.   
 
In suburban and rural assignments, clear, statistically, and 
substantively meaningful differences occur.  In suburban areas, poor 
students are much more likely to be reassigned than non-poor students.  
In rural areas, the non-poor students are the most likely to be 
reassigned.  These patterns suggest that there might be a different set 
of parental involvement and influence in the reassignment process in 
the two settings.  Specifically, suburban non-poor students are able to 
avoid reassignment.  Recall that the school districts in this sample 
are very large and all contain both suburban and rural schools.  
Therefore, when districts alter their school assignments, it is 
possible that each policy might affect students in different geographic 
contexts.  In a zero-sum framework, the suburban families possibly 
avoid reassignments at the expense of the rural non-poor.  In urban 
areas, only a marginal difference (at the 90 significance level) 
emerges in which non-poor students are more likely to be reassigned 
than poor students.   
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Figure 12: Weighted Predicted Probability of Reassignment with 
Interactions between Geography and FRL Eligibility 
 
 Suggestive evidence from the very low rate of reassignment among 
the most advantaged group, the non-poor suburban students, indicates 
that families largely prefer stable educational contexts for their 
children.  Since reassignments likely lead to disruptive school moves, 
reassignments are assumed to be predominantly undesirable.  Indeed, the 
majority of reassignments are to schools of lower quality.  Among 
reassigned students, 63 percent are reassigned to schools with a higher 
proportion of novice teachers, and 56 percent are reassigned to schools 
with higher rates of student poverty.  In the next section of this 
chapter, the models are extended into reassignment subtypes.  The 
intent of that extension is to identify whether observably different 
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students are more likely to be reassigned to schools of lower quality, 
which will be defined as being reassigned to a school with both more 
novice teachers and a higher rate of student poverty at the newly 
assigned school. 
  
2.5 Among reassigned children, who is reassigned to 
lower or higher quality schools: Methods and 
Results  
We have seen that student characteristics are associated with the 
likelihood of reassignment.  Just as these students are heterogeneous, 
so are their potential reassignments.  I therefore generated 
reassignment subtypes to help determine whether certain student 
subgroups are reassigned to schools of lower quality.  This indicator 
was constructed based on the characteristics of students’ assigned 
school in the current year relative to the current year’s 
characteristics of her next year’s assignment.  By generating the 
construct in this manner, the regressions capture the counterfactual 
case for reassigned students because the models compare the 
characteristics of a students’ newly assigned school with where she 
would have been assigned had she not been reassigned.  Further, using 
current year characteristics in the construction prevents incorrectly 
attributing the dynamic results of the policy to the change variables.   
Although reassignment to a new school can be disruptive, if the 
new schools has better resources than existing schools, then moving to 
that school can be an improvement over the status quo.  Reassignment to 
a worse school is an indicator variable that is defined as having both 
a higher percentage of novice teachers and a higher percentage of 
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students in poverty in the school7.  As the following models include 
only students who were reassigned, students that are reassigned to a 
worse school are being compared to reassigned students to school that 
do not have both a higher percentage of poor students in the school and 
a higher proportion of novice teachers.  This sample is now 3.4% of the 
initial student compliers.  Tables 14 and 15 provide summary statistics 
about the characteristics of this reassigned subsample, including 
student demographics and the quality of the reassignments.  Of note, 
fewer than ¼ of reassigned students are reassigned to a better school 
and just over 1/3 are reassigned to a worse school.   
Table 14: Reassignment Subtypes among Initially Compliant Sample 
Types of Reassignment Observations 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Reassigned 
Not Reassigned 60,922 96.6% 0.0% 
Reassigned to Better School 471 0.8% 21.8% 
Reassigned to Worse School 762 2.0% 35.3% 
Reassigned to Other School 926 3.4% 42.9% 
    
Table 15: Characteristics of Reassigned Subsample 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Student Variables    
White 2,159 0.51 0.50 
Black 2,159 0.30 0.46 
Latino 2,159 0.11 0.31 
Asian 2,159 0.03 0.17 
Multi, Other, or Missing Race 2,159 0.05 0.22 
Free or Reduced Price Lunch Eligible 2,159 0.41 0.49 
7 This measurement, while crude, provides for an intuitive interpretation of 
results.  No single variable fully captures school quality, so this chapter 
uses a composite of two key factors assumed to influence students and their 
parents’ perceptions of school quality. Since reassignments appear to be 
generally undesirable, the motivation of the composite measure is to identify 
the very worst of the reassignments.  The kernel densities of the 
distribution of these two change variables can be found in Appendix B.   
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Standardized Math End of Grade Score 2,159 0.06 1.03 
Missing Math EOG Score Indicator 2,159 0.01 0.10 
Limited English Proficient 2,159 0.07 0.26 
Missing LEP Indicator 2,159 0.00 0.05 
Female 2,159 0.51 0.50 
Old for Grade 2,159 0.15 0.36 
Missing Birthday 2,159 0.01 0.10 
Third Grade 2,159 0.51 0.50 
Fourth Grade 2,159 0.49 0.50 
     
Type of School Assignment    
Assigned to Urban School 2,159 0.43 0.50 
Assigned to Suburban or Town School 2,159 0.12 0.33 
Assigned to Rural School 2,159 0.45 0.50 
     
District Variable    
Lagged 5-year District Student 
Population Growth 2,159 4.10 2.88 
  
Using this indicator for reassignment to a worse school, I run 
logistic regressions to explore whether observably different students 
were reassigned to worse schools.  These weighted logistic regression 
models only include the reassigned student subsample.  Consistent with 
the earlier general reassignment models, these weights were constructed 
as the inverse probability that a given student has geocoded address 
data and is also reassigned.  These logistic regressions are of the 
following general form and main effects are presented in Appendix B:   
Log� 𝑅𝑡𝑊𝑆
1−(𝑅𝑡𝑊𝑆)� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
where RtWS means “Reassigned to Worse School.” 
    
Most notable among the main effects are that reassigned suburban 
students are far less likely than their urban or rural student peers to 
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be reassigned to a worse school.  Yet again, and consistent with the 
body of literature on advantaged families, these suburban students 
appear best equipped to prevent undesirable reassignments.  These 
differences are highly statistically significant.  Again, these large 
geographic differences motivate interaction models.  
Figure 13 presents the interactive differences between geography 
and race based on the following model: 
Log� 𝑅𝑡𝑊𝑆
1−(𝑅𝑡𝑊𝑆)� =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆 +  𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
where RtWS means “Reassigned to Worse School.” 
 
 Figure 13: Weighted Predicted Probability of Reassignment to 
Worse School, by Geography * Race Interactions, 2004-2010 
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The most important finding from the figure above is the near-zero 
likelihood of white suburban students to be reassigned to a clearly 
worse school.  Although black suburban students are more likely than 
whites to be reassigned to a worse school, they are less likely than 
whites and blacks in both urban and rural schools to be reassigned to 
worse schools.  This finding implies that black suburban students have 
a protective benefit from the advantaged white suburban students, and 
benefit from the security of the stable suburban environment.  However, 
when adverse reassignments affect suburban areas, black students are 
likely to be affected whereas white students are not.   
The fact that white, suburban students appear best able to avoid 
undesirable reassignments is consistent with existing literature than 
emphasizes ways in which advantaged families can construct the most 
desirable opportunities for their families.  These findings extend that 
work by demonstrating yet another avenue through which these findings 
occur.   
No differences in the likelihood to be reassigned to a worse 
school emerge between urban black and urban Latino students.  Rural 
patterns more closely resembled the urban setting than the suburban 
case: white students were more likely than black or Latino students to 
be reassigned to a school of lower quality.  This finding is somewhat 
surprising because white students and their parents are generally 
assumed to be a very advantaged group.  Therefore, the fact that they 
are more likely to be reassigned to a worse school than their black and 
Latino urban peers is surprising.  I present three plausible 
explanations for this finding.  First, it is possible that the urban 
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whites initially attended the best schools in the city, so the new 
schools were more racially diverse and had more novice teachers as 
compared to their uniquely good urban school.  This regression to the 
mean possibility is tested by examining the school-level math 
proficiency for reassigned urban white, black, and Latino students.   
Figure 14 presents achievement data for the original schools 
reassigned urban white, black, and Latino students attended.  The 
figure demonstrates that reassigned white students indeed attended 
schools with higher initial student achievement.  This finding confirms 
the importance of including initial school controls in the models.  
Despite the inclusion of these independent variables, white students 
are more likely to be reassigned to worse schools.   
  Figure 14: School-wide Test Score Distribution among Reassigned 
Urban Students, by Race  
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Second, it might be the case that the most advantaged whites 
families live in the suburbs (where, according to the regression 
results, they were highly unlikely to be reassigned to worse schools).  
Thus, the white urban students are not as advantaged as white students 
are generally perceived to be.  Instead, these reassigned urban white 
students could have low political and social capital to lobby for 
advantaging reassignments, or at least to prevent adverse 
reassignments.  Unfortunately, I cannot test this hypothesis directly, 
for I know of no population datasets that can be linked to these 
longitudinal student records that contain parents’ political capital.  
Instead, I plot the academic performance of reassigned white students 
in urban, suburban, and rural areas.  Figure 15 demonstrates that 
suburban white students have lower performance than reassigned urban 
and rural whites.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that these urban whites 
do not have sufficient political voice to lobby for their interests.  
Either way, the models include initial student achievement varies by 
geography and reassignment, confirming the need to include student 
achievement as a regression control.  
77 
 
  Figure 15: Individual Student Test Score Distribution among White 
Students, by Geography of Assigned Schools 
Third and finally, it might be the case that the white families 
who are reassigned are not concerned by the policy change because they 
intend to opt for a school of choice or residential change before the 
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being reassigned to lower quality schools, are more likely to opt out 
of those adverse reassignments.  Since urban students have numerous 
school options available to them and many take them (Chapter 1), the 
next chapter will investigate whether they might also be more likely to 
opt out of their reassignments.  This third hypothesis will be tested 
in the following chapter in the investigations of behavioral responses 
to reassignment.   
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
D
en
si
ty
-4 -2 0 2 4
Standardied End-of-Grade Math Score
Urban
Suburban
Rural
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2447
Sample includes Reassigned Students Only
Distribution of Student Performance by Geography
78 
 
 
Next, we turn to Figure 16, which presents the predicted 
probabilities from the following interactive geography-by-FRL model: 
Log� 𝑅𝑡𝑊𝑆
1−(𝑅𝑡𝑊𝑆)� =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 +  𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈 ∗ 𝑭𝑹𝑳 +  𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
 
where RtWS means “Reassigned to Worse School.” 
   
 Figure 16: Weighted Predicted Probability of Reassignment to 
Worse School, by Geography * FRL Interactions, 2004-2010 
In both urban and rural settings, non-poor students were more 
likely to be reassigned to schools of worse quality.  The opposite was 
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followed by poor urban students, poor rural students, poor suburban 
students, and finally non-poor suburban students.   
This figure, along with the former geography-by-race results, 
provides confirmatory evidence that suburban, non-poor families have 
the greatest capacity to preserve better educational opportunities for 
their children.  These families paid a premium for housing, are largely 
compliant with their school assignments (see Chapter 1), and do not 
experience adverse reassignments.  Unlike in the urban case, in which 
white and high academically performing students experience adverse 
reassignments, non-poor suburban students are largely spared from 
reassignments, and especially from lower quality reassignments. 
 
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter demonstrates that changes in districts’ school 
assignment policies are differentially likely to affect observably 
different groups of students.  The results establish which students are 
most likely to experience reassignments, as well as disadvantaging 
reassignments.  The findings can be used to make inferences about 
parents’ access to and involvement in school district political 
processes that affect student assignments.   
The underlying research question in this chapter addressed the 
extent to which observably different students were equally likely to be 
reassigned.  While school districts must at times enact reassignment 
policies, reassignments vary in their quality, defined as the change in 
school quality between students’ existing assignments and their newly-
assigned schools due to reassignment.  This chapter also addressed 
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whether observably different students were equally likely to experience 
clearly adverse reassignments.  To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
these analyses provide the first insight into the prevalence of student 
reassignment policies.   
Reassignment rates in this sample are clearly non-negligible and 
appear worth the effort to explore in greater detail.  General 
reassignment patterns produced the greatest differences by geography: 
rural and urban students were most likely to be reassigned.  
Reassignment rates were also quite varied across the school districts 
in the sample.  In addition, several subgroup patterns emerged from the 
analyses.  For example, poor students in suburban areas were far more 
likely than non-poor suburban students to be reassigned.  In fact, the 
group that was least likely to be reassigned across geography and SES 
was the non-poor suburban students.  This finding validates the key 
inference that suburban non-poor families have a greater capacity than 
the suburban poor families to maintain consistent, and desirable 
educational opportunities for their children.   
Often, suburban housing values are high and the schools 
desirable.  The suburban case is one in which families might be most 
likely to believe that purchasing a home is akin to choosing a 
permanent school assignment.  Potentially, the suburban poor students 
were more susceptible to reassignment because the wealthier families in 
the suburbs tend to have much more financial, social, and political 
capital than poorer families.  Therefore, wealthier families could 
likely organize and engage in the political process to maintain 
assignments to their initial and preferred schools.  This hypothesis 
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about political involvedness and mechanisms of action among suburban 
families cannot be answered here using available secondary data 
sources.  This line of inquiry would require data beyond student 
information that would likely involve primary data collection to gauge 
parents’ involvement in school board policy discussions.  
In urban areas, non-poor students were only marginally more 
likely to be reassigned than poor students.  However, among reassigned 
students, urban non-poor students were far more likely to be reassigned 
to a worse school than the urban poor students.  In rural settings, 
too, non-poor students were more likely than poor students to be 
reassigned and reassigned to a worse school.  Findings from Chapter 1 
in this dissertation demonstrated high rates of noncompliance with 
school assignments among urban and rural non-poor students.  Since this 
sample is limited to the students who comply with their assignments in 
the year prior to reassignment plans, it might be the case that the 
families who were most displeased with the assigned schools had already 
made a school choice decision that removed them from this sample.   
If we are to consider potentially remediating public policies, 
then it will be necessary to understand the process by which these 
policy choices are made.  The existing literature shows that 
disadvantaged families are generally less informed about and connected 
to the political process.  Future investigations should focus on the 
underlying mechanisms of these processes.  While this chapter is 
quantitative, and focuses on annual cross-section data, such a future 
study might be more qualitative, following a single district 
considering enacting a redistricting policy.  It would evaluate the 
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influences and processes leading to the final boundaries and could 
follow the different iterations of proposed reassignment plans. 
The following chapter in this dissertation addresses the 
behavioral responses of families to reassignment.  Those findings will 
help to extend the results from this chapter in greater detail.  For 
example, it might be the case that reassigned non-poor students do not 
comply with those worse assignments or it could be the case that choice 
policies and the transient nature of disadvantaged students leads them 
to comply less with reassignments.  These different options produce 
very different policy implications for the reassignment patterns 
presented in this chapter.    
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Chapter 3: Behavioral responses to 
reassignment 
3.1 Introduction  
The former two chapters of this dissertation characterize which 
students are most likely to comply with schools assignments at baseline 
and which students are most likely to be reassigned when school 
districts alter school attendance zones.  This chapter investigates 
whether families who complied with their initial school assignments 
still comply with school assignments following student reassignment 
policies.  It identifies overall compliance with reassignments and then 
breaks down non-adherence to the policies by student subgroup and 
reassignment quality.  Analyses identify specific types of 
noncompliance, including opting for an explicit school of choice, 
attending a non-assigned public school, leaving the public school 
system, and moving residences.  Identifying families’ compliance with 
reassignments allows inferences to be made about parents’ satisfaction 
with reassignments.  Often, school districts have no choice but to 
enact these policies; however, their design can influence parents’ 
satisfaction with the polies.  Most importantly, parents seek to avoid 
disruption in their education of their children; therefore, I identify 
the extent to which observably different families take actions to avoid 
these disruptive school moves that results from reassignment policies.  
Overall, reassignment catalyzes families not to comply with their new 
assignments.  Given that many noncompliant families send their child to 
the original school bolsters the hypothesis that families principally 
seek to avoid disruptions in their students’ educational experiences.  
84 
 
 
The research principally extends the body of knowledge on default 
behaviors.     
Reassignment policies change the default school of a student.  
The new default school is the students’ school of record, unless her 
family takes proactive steps to send her to an alternate school, or to 
move residences to change the school assignment.  Policies can be 
designed as having either opt-in or opt-out defaults.  Evidence from 
behavioral economics and medical studies indicates that individuals are 
most likely to follow the default option (eg. Johnson and Goldstein 
2003; Thaler and Bernatzi 2004; Gale, Iwry, Orszag 2005; Johnson and 
Goldstein 2003; Madrian and Shea 2001).  The typical default option is 
for students to remain at their nearby, traditional neighborhood public 
school unless families make an explicit choice to send their children 
to a different school of choice such as a charter, magnet school, or 
year-round school (see chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of these 
school types).  In the case of policies that reassign students, a 
reassigned student’s default situation is to change schools to a 
different school from her prior year’s assignment.  Since reassignment 
plans alter students’ default school, parents and students must “choose 
to choose” should they want to avoid switching schools.   
Some parents of reassigned students may view different default 
options an opportunity to attend a school of choice, since a change in 
schools is already forthcoming.  Given that a school move seems 
inevitable, these reassigned families might elect to review the various 
school options opt for a school of choice.  Alternatively, the policy 
might not alter families’ propensity to attend their newly assigned 
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default school.  These families are most likely to comply with all 
defaults, including assignment and reassignment policies.  People 
commonly defer making choices both when none of the available options 
is ideal and when they cannot ascertain easily sure which option is 
best (Dhar 1997).  Therefore, some families might comply with 
reassignments because they have challenges learning about and selecting 
an alternate school option.  This chapter seeks to identify the 
likelihoods of these different choices, including subdivision by 
quality of assignment and student subgroup (race, socioeconomic status, 
and urban, suburban, or rural school location).  Some families will 
move residences as a consequence of school reassignment; models also 
investigate these residential decisions.  The observed noncompliance 
among different students and reassignment subtypes allows inferences to 
be made about parents’ satisfaction with school reassignment policies.  
As school district policies should provide more benefits than harms to 
the families within their borders, observed parent behaviors can help 
identify whether families are indeed happier with the reassignment 
policy than in its absence.   
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
This chapter addresses (a) whether, and (b) how families do not 
comply with reassignment policies.  Both questions include related sub-
questions about compliance by student characteristic and by the quality 
of reassignments.  Figure 17 below demonstrates how observed compliance 
and noncompliance can also be used to make inferences about parents’ 
satisfaction with the reassignment policies.  Results from models in 
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this chapter allow inferences to be made about parents’ satisfaction 
with reassignments by identifying which families do and do not comply 
with the policies.   
        
District Policy:  
Alter School 
Assignment 
Plans  
Inference: 
Parents’ 
Satisfaction 
with 
Reassignment 
Policy Outcome:  
Some students 
are Reassigned 
Observed Outcome:  
Some Students do 
not Comply with 
Reassignments 
 Figure 17: Model of How to Make Inferences about Parents’ Level 
of Satisfaction with Reassignments given their Compliance 
Behavior 
Some families who are reassigned comply with their reassignments.  
Three plausible explanations may account for this compliant behavior.  
Either (a) families are generally pleased with the schools to which 
their children have been reassigned are therefore content to send their 
children to the newly assigned schools.  Alternatively, (b) families 
might prefer to change schools but lack the political or social capital 
to make the change.  Finally, (c) some families might have a tendency 
to accept any default plan, including new assignments due to 
reassignment policies, with or without fully evaluating all of the 
school choice options.   
Other families who are who are reassigned opt for a school other 
than their new assignments.  Three plausible explanations are most 
likely to describe this compliant behavior.  Either (a) families are 
displeased with the reassignments and therefore opt out of them.  These 
families could be dissatisfied with the disruptive nature of the move, 
or they might dislike the characteristics of the newly assigned school.  
Alternatively, (b) noncompliant families might tend to move residences 
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more frequently than non-reassigned families, producing a spurious 
correlation between reassignment and noncompliance.  Finally, (c) the 
policies might stimulate some families to consider additional school 
choice options given that their students would have to switch schools 
with or without an explicit choice on their part.   
As Chapter 1 demonstrated, many families do not comply with their 
school assignments.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect some of both 
reassigned and non-reassigned students not to comply with their school 
assignments.  If rates of noncompliance are higher among reassigned 
families than non-reassigned families, it can be inferred that parents 
do not like to be reassigned.  Since some portion of both compliant and 
non-compliant families are likely follow their default options, 
regardless of whether or not they are reassigned, the increase in 
noncompliance among reassigned families can be interpreted as a minimum 
level of dissatisfaction with the new assignments.  Either these 
reassigned families do not like their new assignment relative to the 
original school, or they do not like the new assignment relative to the 
new additional school choices they consider as a consequence of the 
policy.   
 
3.3 The Consequences of Student Mobility  
 
The negative associations between student movement and 
educational outcomes are well-documented.  “Student mobility” can 
describe a school change, a residential change, or both.  Reassignment 
policies, if families adhere to them, should increase student mobility.  
Movement is largely associated with poor academic performance (eg. 
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Engec 2006; Schwartz, Stiefel, and Chalico 2007; Rumberger and Larson 
1998; Rumberger 2003) and low school engagement (eg. Gruman et al. 
2008).  Widespread evidence suggests movement within a district rather 
than between districts is harmful for students (Hanushek et al. 2004; 
Ingersoll et al. 1989; Rumberger 2003; Xu et al. 2009).  Within-
district moves are considered more harmful to students because these 
moves are “reactive,” or in response to life disruptions, rather than 
mobility expressly intended to improve opportunities.  However, student 
moves are often bundled with other life disruptions, including parental 
divorce, job loss/change, or disciplinary problems (eg. Ligon and 
Paredes 1992).  Therefore, some scholars claim most of the negative 
effect of moving is due to the differences between movers and nonmovers 
themselves, and not the moves (Downey and Pribesh 1999).   
Existing literature, however, applies principally to reactive 
assignments where the change in school occurs secondarily to a primary 
life-altering event.  It is not clear whether the consequences of 
mobility instigated by the school district, as opposed to the family, 
will tend to be proactive or reactive.  In some cases, reassignment can 
be analogous to increasing school choice, implying that the 
consequences could be more consistent with traditionally proactive 
moves.  For example, a move might be positive if the student transfers 
to a higher performing school or one that is a better match (see, for 
instance, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004; Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 
2005; Holme and Richards 2009).  However, as Chapter 2 demonstrated, 
non-poor suburban families in this sample avoided reassignments.  
Therefore, it is plausible that the mobility derived from these 
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reassignment policies can be assumed to be an additional form of 
reactive student mobility.   
 
3.4 Description of Data 
 
This chapter uses the same sample and dataset that were used in 
the former chapter (see Figure 2 and Table 1).  The sample includes the 
third and fourth grade students, their schools, and their parents in a 
subset of growing North Carolina school districts from 2003/04 to 
2010/11 who complied with their initial school assignments.  This 
restriction helps demonstrate the impacts of the policy on the set of 
students who are most likely to be affected by school districts’ school 
reassignment policies.  In this chapter, I continue to use the sampling 
weights that were described in Chapters 1 and 21.   
Chapter 2 of this dissertation modeled the associations between 
student characteristics and the quality of their reassignment.  This 
chapter identifies the school each student actually attends in the 
school year following reassignment policies.  For example, students in 
2008/09 who experience a reassignment for the 2009/10 school year were 
flagged as “reassigned” in the former chapter.  This chapter identifies 
where students attend school in the 2009/10 school year using 
administrative data.  In so doing, it is possible to identify whether 
each student attends her assigned school (complier) or attends a non-
assigned school (non-complier).   
1 The weights are constructed as the inverse likelihood a student has address 
data and assignment data in consecutive years, and are identical to the weights 
used in Chapters 1 and 2.   
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Table 16 presents the compliance and noncompliance rates for the 
sample of both reassigned and non-reassigned students in this chapter.  
Several distinct pattern differences emerge, most notably that the non-
reassigned subgroup is far more likely to comply with assignments (75%) 
than the reassigned group (47%).  Of the non-compliers, the majority 
attend some type of identifiable school of choice: 32 students attended 
a nonassigned magnet, 151 attended a nonassigned year-round school, 7 
attended a charter school, and 564 attended their originally assigned 
school despite having been reassigned.  Thus, the largest share of 
students continued to attend their original school assignments.   
Relatively similar proportions of reassigned and non-reassigned 
students attend a non-assigned traditional public school (12% and 10%, 
respectively) and attrit from the sample (8% and 6%, respectively).  
These similar proportions could indicate the transient nature of a 
subset of the public school student body.  The values might also serve 
as a resonable minimum threshold of noncompliance to expect regardless 
of any change to school assignments.   
Table 16: Next Year’s Behaviors among Initial Compliers, Number 
and percentage of subgroup 
Next Year’s Behavioral Responses 
Not Reassigned 
Subgroup 
(n=60,922) 
 
Reassigned 
Subgroup 
(n=2,159) 
Comply 45,813 (75%) 1,009 (47%) 
Non-Assigned Traditional Public School  6,004 (10%) 262 (12%) 
Non-Assigned Magnet, Charter, Year-
Round, or Original Assignment 4,476 (7%) 754 (35%) 
Attrit from Public Schools 4,629 (8%) 134 (6%) 
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3.5 What types of Families Do not Comply: Methods 
and Results 
 
The first research question in this chapter asks: “What types of 
families do not comply with reassignment policies?”  Several logistic 
regressions that predict students’ noncompliance with their school 
assignments will help to answer this research question.  Each logistic 
regression is weighted by the inverse likelihood students are in the 
sample.  These are the same weights used in both chapters 1 and 2 and 
allow inferences to be made about all students in the sample districts.  
The dependent variable in the models is a binary indicator for whether 
a student complies with her new assignment for the following year and 
is a function of a vector of student characteristics, a vector of 
initial school characteristics, the lagged 5-year total student 
population growth in the district, and fixed effects for the district, 
grade, and year.  The independent variable of primary interest is the 
indicator for whether a student is reassigned.  In addition, to 
determine whether patterns differ by student subgroup, additional 
demographic variables and interactive models will help facilitate that 
investigation.  The most general model takes the following form, where 
the key covariate is an indicator for whether a student is reassigned:  
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)� = 𝛽0 +   𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝟎,𝟏] + 
𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
where “DnC” means Does not Comply with next year’s assignment. 
 
Individual-level covariates include student race (White is the 
reference group and other race options are Black, Latino, Asian, 
Multi/Other), FRL (the reference group is not poor), the geography of 
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the school to which a student was assigned (City is the reference 
groups, and the other geography options are suburb and rural), a 
students’ standardized math test score, indicators for being Limited 
English Proficient, female, and old for grade (defined as having a 
birthdate after the cutoff for students in that grade and year).  As 
observably different students might respond to changing school defaults 
differently, these covariates are important to include in the models.  
The regression output for this basic, non-interactive model is 
presented in Appendix C. 
The figures that follow present predicted probabilities for 
select covariates.  The first figure demonstrates the different rates 
of noncompliance across the sample school districts.  Noncompliance 
with next year’s assignments varies across districts in the sample from 
about 6 percent in Union County to 17 percent in Durham County.  The 
sample excludes students in promotional grades of school, so none of 
this noncompliance is structural.  Given that the sample excludes 
students who did not attend their assigned school in the prior year, 
these rates reflect “new” non-compliers in each school district.   
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  Figure 18: Weighted Predicted Probabitliy of Nonompliance with 
Next Year's School Assignment, by District, 2004-2010 
To determine the association between theoretically-relevant 
independent variables and whether a student “Does not Comply,” I ran 
the following model:   
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)� =  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝟎,𝟏] +  𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 +  
𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆 +  𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒐𝒓 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽6 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.  
 
Most notable is the large difference in compliance among students 
who either are or are not reassigned between years.  Whereas 10 percent 
of initial compliers who were not reassigned do not attend their 
assigned school the following year, 40 percent of reassigned students 
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do not attend their assigned school.  Graphs of the predicted 
probabilities of select covariates can be found in Appendix C. 
In the former two chapters, geography produced highly different 
patterns in the association between students’ likelihood to be 
reassigned and to be reassigned to schools of lower quality.  Given 
these large differences by geography, I choose to estimate an 
interactive model to determine whether behavioral differences occur by 
subgroups in the different geographic contexts.  The weighted logistic 
regression predicts whether a student “Does not Comply” with her school 
assignment according to interactions between students’ eligibility for 
free/reduced price lunch and school geography in the following form: 
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)� =  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝟎,𝟏] +  𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒐𝒓 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗
𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒐𝒓 + 𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 ∗
𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 + 𝜷𝟔 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒐𝒓 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 +  𝜷𝟕 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒐𝒓 ∗
𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 +
𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.  
  
Select predicted probabilities for this model are provided in 
Figure 19.  These results demonstrate consistently higher noncompliance 
among the reassigned subgroup of students in each geographic locale2.  
Even among non-reassigned students, poor students are about twice as 
likely as non-poor students not to comply.  Rural non-poor students are 
the least likely among reassigned subgroups not to comply (22%) 
immediately following school reassignment.  Students in this most 
compliant reassigned subgroup are statistically more likely not to 
2 Consistent with the former two chapters, recall that geography is derived from 
the National Center for Education Statistics and the United States Census and 
refers to the school location.  All students assigned to a given school are 
described as having that school’s urban/suburban/rural geographic designation.   
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comply than all non-reassigned students, other than urban poor, with 
whom no statistically significant difference emerges.  Urban and rural 
poor students are more likely not to comply than suburban poor 
students.  The largest subgroup difference in noncompliance for a given 
geographic type and reassignment status occurs between reassigned rural 
non-poor and poor students: poor rural students who are reassigned did 
not comply with the new assignments about 60 percent of the time versus 
about 22 percent of non-poor reassigned rural students.   
 Figure 19: Weighted Predicted Probabitliy of Noncompliance with 
next Year’s Assignment, by Geography, FRL, and Reassignment, 
2004-2010 
Suburban reassigned students do not have a different statistical 
likelihood of noncompliance according to their socioeconomic status.  
As the former chapter demonstrated, suburban students -- especially 
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non-poor suburban students -- were the least likely group of students 
to be reassigned.  They also had a very low likelihood of being 
reassigned to a school with more student poverty and more novice 
teachers.  Therefore, this subgroup has a very small sample size, which 
makes group differences difficult to establish.  Still, suburban non-
poor students have a larger point estimate (30%) than poor suburban 
students (25%).  This is the only group for which there is not a 
clearly larger likelihood for noncompliance among the poorer students, 
again bolstering the hypothesis about suburban non-poor families having 
the greatest capacity to construct and maintain the most desirable 
outcomes for their children.   
Since these students all complied with their school assignments 
in the year prior to the reassignment policies, the noncompliance 
predicted probabilities for non-reassigned students helps demonstrate a 
reasonable minimum estimate for noncompliance that can be expected in 
the sample school districts.  Specifically, non-poor students appear to 
have a baseline rate of noncompliance around 5-10% and poor students 
between 10-20%.  These predicted baseline rates of noncompliance are 
far lower than noncompliance estimates in Chapter 1, especially for 
urban students.  In addition, Chapter 1 demonstrated that non-poor 
students in both the suburbs and in rural schools were more likely not 
to comply than their poor classmates.  Among the initial compliers, 
then, the higher rate of noncompliance among poor students can be the 
result of several causes.  Poorer students might be least pleased with 
the changes, might be most likely to exercise some new school choice 
option, or they might be more transient than non-poor students.  Given 
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that non-poor suburban and rural students had higher baseline rates of 
noncompliance, the non-poor families that were discontent with the 
assignments had likely already acted.  Thus, the elevated rate of 
noncompliance for poor rural students is likely a signal that 
reassignment policies catalyzed new choices by families to opt out of 
school assignments.   
The implications of the former model are twofold.  First, and 
most important, reassignment increases noncompliance among reassigned 
families.  Thus, families who previously complied with their school 
assignments are no longer content with their (new) default school.  
Second, clear socioeconomic patterns emerge.  Poor students in urban 
and rural schools are more likely than their non-poor classmates not to 
comply; however, reassigned poor and non-poor suburban students do not 
have different rates of noncompliance3.  The least likely reassigned 
group of students not to comply is the non-poor rural students.  These 
patterns hint at different capacities of families by geographic and 
financial characteristic to engage in school choice when districts 
reassign students.  The non-poor rural families in this sample reside 
in school districts that also contain suburban and urban families who 
take up school choice options.  Therefore, the low rate of 
noncompliance among the rural non-poor families appears to signal that 
3 I also ran interactive models by geography-and-race.  The findings indicate 
that reassignment produces an approximate doubling in the likelihood of 
noncompliance across the different race-by-geography groupings.  In each 
geographic type, reassigned white students are more likely than non-reassigned 
black students to not to comply with the new assignment.  In other words, 
reassignment status trumps race as a predictor of compliance.  This finding 
implies that changing the default option promotes new choices, rather than 
families continuing to send their child to the new default school. 
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they have less access to the school choice options relative to their 
urban and suburban peers. 
As was done in Chapter 1, I calculate dissimilarity indices that 
compare segregation by race and FRL eligibility by comparing the actual 
segregation with the hypothetical segregation had all students attended 
their school assignments.  These values are reported in Figure 17.  The 
results indicate that when students opt out of their school 
assignments, segregation increases.  These findings are consistent for 
both race and FRL as well as across all geographic contexts.  The 
implication is that the choices families make not to comply with their 
reassignments increase segregation.   
Table 17: Dissimilarity indices by Race and FRL Status, by 
geography 
Type of 
School 
Assignment 
White-Nonwhite 
Comparison 
FRL-non-FRL 
Comparison 
 Assignments 
Actual 
School 
Assign
ments 
Actual 
School 
Urban  .42 .49 .32 .36 
Suburban .39 .41 .30 .32 
Rural  .49 .53 .26 .31 
 
Given that the geographic associations are less substantial in 
magnitude than in prior chapters, the following models will control 
for, but not independently report, geographic differences.  Instead, I 
shift the emphasis to the different reassignment subtypes by quality 
defined in Chapter 24.  Again, models compare the quality of students’ 
4 This indicator was constructed based on the characteristics of students’ 
assigned school in the current year relative to the current year’s 
characteristics of her next year’s assignment.  Reassignment subtypes are 
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school assignments by comparing the percentage of students eligible for 
free or reduced price lunch and the percentage of teachers with 0-3 
years of experience at their initial assigned school with their newly 
assigned school due to reassignment.  The following models are logistic 
regressions, and the independent variable of interest is the quality of 
the students’ reassignment.  This model predicts whether a student 
“Does not Comply” and is of the following form: 
Log� 𝐷𝑛𝐶
1−(𝐷𝑛𝐶)�  =  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒓,𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒆,𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓,𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒆] +  
𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 
 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. 
 
Results in Figure 20 demonstrate that all reassigned students are 
far more like than non-reassigned students not to comply, regardless of 
the quality of the reassigned school.  These findings yet again imply 
that reassignment is the driver of noncompliance.  It seems that the 
negative shock of student mobility drives parents’ choices not to 
comply with the new school assignment, regardless of the quality of 
that new school.     
 
defined as “worse” if they are to schools with more novice teachers and more 
poor students relative to students’ original schools, “better” if they are to 
schools with fewer novice teachers and poor students relative to students’ 
original schools.  When the direction of change in student poverty rate and 
percentage of novice teachers is mixed, the reassignment is considered neither 
better, nor worse, and is classified as “other.”  Table 14 provides frequencies 
of these reassignment subtypes.    
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  Figure 20: Probability of Noncompliance, by Reassignment Quality 
 
3.6 How do Families Respond: Methods and Results 
The previous section of this chapter established the large and 
statistically significant association between student reassignment and 
noncompliance with school assignments.  This section now turns to some 
of the ways in which families do not comply with reassignments.  
Remaining analyses address the research question, “How do families 
respond to reassignment policies?”  First, I use a non-interactive, 
weighted, multinomial logistic regression determines the different 
behavioral responses for reassigned and non-reassigned families.  The 
frequencies of the behaviors are provided in Table 16.  Responses 
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include complying with next year’s assignment, attending a non-assigned 
traditional public school, attending a non-assigned school that uses a 
known choice mechanism (magnet, charter, year-round, and being 
grandfathered into original school), and whether the student attrits 
from the sample.  To identify these different behavioral responses, the 
multinomial logistic regression is of the following general form.  Main 
effects of select covariates are presented in Appendix C and the 
behavioral outcomes by reassignment status are presented in Figure 21:  
Log�𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑜𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) � = 
𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒔𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝟎,𝟏] +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 
𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
 
 
Log�𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) � =                                       
𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒔𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝟎,𝟏] +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 
𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,          
 
Log� 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙)� =                                      
𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑰𝒔𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅 [𝟎,𝟏] +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 
𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.           
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  Figure 21: Weighted Predicted Probabitliy of Noncompliance Types, 
by Reassignment, All locales together, 2004-2011 
Reassigned students are more like than non-reassigned students 
not to comply by attending either a school of choice or a non-assigned 
traditional public school.  There is no association between 
reassignment and attrition from the sample.  Both reassigned students 
and non-reassigned students have about a 15-16% likelihood of 
noncompliance to a non-assigned traditional public school.  Of note, 
these predicted values are about the same as the noncompliance 
predictions in Chapter 1.   
Reassigned students have about a 40% predicted probability of 
attending a non-assigned school of choice.  Within this overarching 
noncompliance category is attending the same school despite being 
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reassigned.  The following figure compares the individual math 
performance of reassigned third and fourth graders of this 
“grandfathered” group of students to their reassigned peers who 
complied with the reassignments.  The curves demonstrate that the third 
graders who remain enrolled in their original schools often have lower 
math performance than the compliers.  Since reassigned families 
commonly stay in their original schools, it can be inferred that 
parents appear concerned, first and foremost, with avoiding having 
their children change schools.  Subsequent subgroup anlyses will 
address whether these overall patterns differ by observable student 
characteristic.   
 Figure 22: Distribution of Standardized Math Test Score 
Performance among Reassigned Initial Compliers who Attend Schools 
where Some Students Remain at the School Despite Being Reassigned 
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By using a weighted multinomial logistic regression, I seek to 
evaluate whether noncompliance differs by the quality of the reassigned 
school relative to the original school.  The independent variable of 
interest is the “quality of reassignment” variable, which again is 
defined according to the percentage of FRL students and novice teachers 
at students’ original school and their next year’s assignments.  This 
multinomial logistic regression is of the following form: 
Log�𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑜𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) � = 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 [0, 1] + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑸𝒍𝒕𝒚𝑶𝒇𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓′𝒔𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 
𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  
𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,  
 
Log�𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) � =                                       
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 [0, 1] + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑸𝒍𝒕𝒚𝑶𝒇𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓′𝒔𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 
𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  
𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,           
 
Log� 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙)� =                                      
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 [0, 1] + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑸𝒍𝒕𝒚𝑶𝒇𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓′𝒔𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 
𝛽3 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  
𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.           
 
Of note, the model would not converge with four behavioral 
responses and four reassignment quality types; therefore, I combined 
the “better” and “other” reassignment classifications.  Again, this 
composite score, although crude, provides a valuable indication of the 
worst reassignments.  Since reassignments clearly catalyze 
noncompliance, it can be inferred from these revealed behaviors that 
families are not pleased with being reassigned.  Therefore, this 
construct for worse school provides a useful reference because it 
105 
 
 
provides an estimate for the very worst reassignments while also 
accounting for the characteristics of students’ initial schools.   
Again, results indicate that disentangling the differences 
between reassignment quality are less of a factor than being reassigned 
or not.  This finding is most striking for newly attending a school of 
choice or attending the original school.  Students assigned to a 
different school of either worse or an indeterminate change in quality 
are commonly enticed to seek alternate schools, including non-assigned, 
non-choice public schools.  Reassignment quality again is not 
associated with enrolling in a non-assigned traditional public school 
or sample attrition.  Yet again, these findings support the hypothesis 
that when disruptions affect the stability of students’ educational 
environments, when possible, parents will seek alternate options. 
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  Figure 23: Weighted Predicted Probabitliy of Noncompliance Types, 
by Reassignment Subtypes, All locales together, 2004-2010 
Finally, I examine whether any association between reassignment 
and residential mobility exists.  It is difficult to ascertain from 
this model whether reassigned students would have been as likely to 
move residences in the absence of this policy, or if their very 
likelihood to move made them more susceptible to be reassigned.  
Results from Chapter 1 demonstrate that many students do not attend 
their assigned schools and Chapter 2 provides evidence that certain 
families are more likely to be reassigned than others.  Perhaps 
districts intentionally reassign the already-mobile students, for those 
students will experience a disruption in their schooling regardless of 
whether they are reassigned.  Despite this possibility, I run the 
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following weighed logistic regression, and report the predicted 
probabilities for select covariates.  
Log� 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
1−(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡)� =  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 +  𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑮𝒆𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉𝒚 +  𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆 +  𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑷𝒐𝒐𝒓 + 
𝛽5 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽7 ∗
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +  𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟.  
 
Figure 24 indicates that reassignment, indeed, catalyzes families 
to move residences.  Reassignments of all quality (better, worse, and 
other) have a far higher association with student mobility than non-
reassigned students.  It also supports the findings in other literature 
that urban, poor, and minority student are often more mobile.   
 Figure 24: Weighted Predicted Probabitliy of Moving Residences, 
by select covariates, All locales together, 2004-2011 
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3.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter identified the behavioral responses of families in 
select North Carolina school districts with third and fourth grade 
student when school districts enact reassignment policies.  It reported 
families’ compliance with school reassignments, and characterized the 
specific behavioral responses among noncompliant families.  More than 
any subgroup identifier (geography, race, FRL, and their interactions), 
being reassigned produces the largest association with noncompliance: 
over half of reassigned upper elementary students do not comply with 
their new assignments.  Noncompliance occurs across the school quality 
spectrum, and for all racial, socioeconomic, and geographic student 
subgroups.  Overall, the reassignment policies appear to stimulate more 
families to make explicit school choice decisions than they might have 
in the absence of such policies.  These high rates of noncompliance 
lead to the inference that parents are largely displeased with the 
prospects of being reassigned.  Given that the most common behavioral 
response to reassignment is to continue to attend the original school 
assignment, much of the non-compliance with assignments still leaves 
students in their same school.  This choice to remain in the original 
school provides suggestive evidence that parents seek to avoid 
disruptions in their children’s’ schooling.  Noncompliant parents of 
reassigned students appear to be principally seeking to prevent student 
mobility.   
Baseline rates of noncompliance for non-reassigned students 
provide insights about the minimum rates of student mobility that 
school districts can expect.  Even among the initial compliers, over 10 
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percent of students do not comply with their next years’ assignments.  
As school districts must distribute students among the schools within 
their borders, having this many students unlikely to attend their next 
years’ assignments can produce difficulties in planning for staffing 
and other needs at schools.  In addition, the choices families make to 
opt out of their reassignments increases both racial and socioeconomic 
segregation in the school districts.   
Related to student mobility, findings in this chapter indicate 
that associations between student reassignment and students changing 
residences are highly correlated.  All reassignment subtypes are 
associated with increased residential mobility.  Future extensions to 
this research might consider investigating whether families with 
students in grades other than third and fourth grade also alter their 
decisions as a consequence reassignment policies.  In addition, 
extensions of this study would benefit by identifying whether 
reassignment policies generate any academic impacts on reassigned 
students or their peers.  Finally, whereas this chapter inferred 
parents’ preferences by observing their actions, additional work on 
noncompliance with reassignment policies would benefit from interviews 
and other qualitative data to confirm and refine the conclusions.   
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Conclusions 
When education policy scholars study the factors that influence 
students, they typically focus on student-, classroom-, teacher-, and 
school-level factors.  These factors are not only proximal to students 
but also much easier to study than district policy decisions-- reliable 
data on school district policies and their functional consequences are 
scarce and difficult to access.  When scholars study school district 
policies, they generally focus on policy choices that are simple and 
easy to measure such as hiring decisions, teacher salaries, school 
finances, curriculum, and testing.  Other choices, such as decisions 
about where school properties will be located and the school 
assignments of students within a district are typically ignored.   
To date, school assignment and reassignment policies have not 
been studied in great rigor, in part due to the difficulty in acquiring 
data on students’ residential locations along with their school 
assignments.  To the best of my knowledge, these data sources have 
never been linked across multiple school districts and years so as to 
enable rigorous, generalizable studies of student reassignment 
policies.  After compiling longitudinal data on school assignments, I 
was fortunate to be able to merge exact student address data to create 
a new dataset with precise linkage of students to school assignments 
and reassignments.  The result of my data collection efforts not only 
enabled the work described herein, but the technique to match 
longitudinal geographic data with administrative student records could 
also be applied to other future education policy research questions for 
which precise student geographic data is required.   
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School district student assignment and reassignment policies set 
the distributional patterns of students among schools within each 
district.  Advantaged families utilize this process to further 
construct and maintain improved educational opportunities for their 
children in three core ways: they can afford to live in homes with the 
most desirable school assignments (Chapter 1), they influence the 
policy process to avoid adverse reassignments (Chapter 2), and often do 
not comply with school reassignments (Chapter 3). 
Overall, the first chapter finds that noncompliance with school 
assignments ranges from 6 percent to 40 percent.  Even the school 
district in the sample that has no explicit school choice options has 
18 percent noncompliance.  45 percent of urban blacks and less than 20 
percent of both suburban and rural whites attend a non-assigned school.  
It seems urban students have many choices available to them and often 
take them whereas suburban and rural families, when they do not comply, 
are more likely to attend a non-choice school.  These findings lead to 
the inference that urban families are less content with their 
assignments, and many of these families take advantage of their school 
choice options.  Of note, these collective noncompliance choices 
increase racial segregation in the districts relative to if students 
had all attended their assigned schools.  The findings from Chapter 1 
are consistent with existing literature on families’ residential 
choices, financial freedom, advantaged actors “voting with their feet,” 
and schools being more segregated as a result of school choice than in 
its absence.  The work extends existing bodies of knowledge by 
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investigating school choices in multiple school districts and across 
multiple years. 
In the second chapter, I find that of the initial compliers with 
school assignments, 2 to 16 percent of students in the sample districts 
are reassigned.  At a minimum, this is a clearly a non-negligible 
potential policy impact.  By student subgroup, suburban students are 
highly unlikely to be reassigned, especially suburban non-poor 
students.  Rural non-poor are reassigned, and are reassigned to schools 
of lower quality than their original schools.  Considering that these 
are very large districts with many schools, inferences can be drawn 
that suburban families are able to outcompete rural families to 
maintain stable educational environments for their children. 
In the third chapter, I investigate noncompliance patterns 
following reassignment policies.  Families that are reassigned are 
highly likely to not comply with their new assignments across 
geographic, racial, and socioeconomic subgroups.  Noncompliance rates 
at least double each subgroup pattern by reassignment status and are as 
high as 60 percent among the reassigned rural poor.  Students who do 
not comply are most likely to attend their original schools, implying 
that stability is the largest driver of noncompliance.  Again, 
noncompliance increases school segregation by both race and 
socioeconomic status.  Reassignment is also associated with higher 
rates of student mobility.   
A story emerges from the dissertation about more than just the 
compliance behaviors and political economy of families to assignment 
and reassignment policies.  Synthesizing the findings across the 
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chapters provides meaningful student subgroup patterns that are also 
consistent with existing literature.  Emerging from the three chapters 
collectively is a story about three groups-- suburban students, poor 
urban students, and non-poor rural students.    
The most advantaged parents, those who live in the suburbs and 
who are not poor, have the greatest capacity to generate and maintain 
educational resources for their children.  Results from these three 
dissertation chapters reveal patterns consistent with the hypotheses 
that these families take proactive, preventative steps to produce the 
optimal educational opportunities for their children, yet they are also 
able to react to undesirable policies, when necessary.  First, these 
families have sufficient financial capital to live in homes with 
desirable school assignments.  Only rarely do these non-poor suburban 
families opt out of their school assignments.  Second, these families 
have sufficient political capital to avoid disruptive student 
reassignments, and reassignments to schools with more poverty and more 
novice teachers.  Finally, in the rare case that these families are 
reassigned, 30 percent opt out of the reassignments.   
 The students generally considered to be disadvantaged in the 
educational process are urban students who are poor.  These students 
often attend low performing, highly segregated schools (Sohoni and 
Saporito 2009) that have less qualified teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd, 
Vigdor 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, Wheeler 2006) and principals 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, Wheeler 2006; Loeb, Kalogrides, Horng 2010) 
and high rates of teacher turnover (Jacob 2007; Scafidi, Sjoquist, 
Stinebrickner 2007).  Although these families generally do not have 
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sufficient resources to live in areas assigned to the highest 
performing schools, many of these families are able to take advantage 
of school choice policies.  Results in the three chapters demonstrate 
that unlike suburban non-poor families who make proactive residential 
and school choice decisions, these poor urban families generally react 
to the policies.  First, although they live in areas with undesirable 
school assignments, these poor, urban families have very high rates of 
noncompliance with their school assignments.  Their decision to opt out 
of assignments demonstrates their dissatisfaction with their school 
assignments; at the same time, their behavior demonstrates that they 
have access to alternate options.  Second, these families are nearly 4 
times as likely as the non-poor suburban families to be reassigned and 
are 5 times as likely to be reassigned to worse schools.  These high 
rates of reassignment demonstrate that these families might be 
politically marginalized in the student reassignment process.  Despite 
their low political capital, these families are the most likely student 
subgroup to opt out of their new assignments following reassignment 
policies.  This behavior, while reactive, does still enable the 
students to avoid disruptive school moves.   
 Non-poor students who attend rural schools within districts also 
containing urban and suburban areas demonstrate mixed advantaging and 
disadvantaging behaviors.  Although these families have financial 
means, their rural schools and the surrounding areas likely have fewer 
resources than either the suburbs (with neighborhoods and families that 
politically organize) or cities (where choice options are more abundant 
and where policies are sometimes designed with these students 
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specifically in mind to improve equity).  After students at urban 
schools, the rural non-poor students are the most likely not to comply 
with initial school assignments.  These revealed preferences suggest 
that these families are not entirely content with their rural school 
offerings.  The rural non-poor are the most likely group to be 
reassigned and roughly tie with the urban non-poor for likelihood of 
reassignment to a school of lower quality.  Since these reassignment 
policies are enacted within very large school districts containing both 
rural and suburban schools, it seems the rural families are outcompeted 
by advantaged suburban families.  Unlike suburban families, however, 
reassigned rural students typically comply with their reassignments.  
Perhaps both the high propensity to be reassigned and the low rate of 
noncompliance demonstrate that rural non-poor families, despite having 
financial resources, have little political and social capital.  Of 
note, since the rural areas represented in this sample were contained 
within school districts which also contained urban and suburban areas, 
the results likely cannot be extended to districts that are purely 
rural. 
The school districts in this sample are all growing in population 
and have a mixture of school types: three of the districts contain both 
suburban and rural schools and three contain suburban, urban, urban, 
and rural schools.  North Carolina is not unique in this regard: all 50 
states have school districts with both suburban and rural schools in at 
least one school district and 48 states (all states other than Hawaii 
and Vermont) have this mixture of school locales along with student 
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population growth from 2003/04-2010/115.  In the 2010-11 school year, of 
the 47.2 million students in United States traditional schools serving 
K-12 students, nearly half of the nation’s students (47.5 percent) 
attended schools in school districts with suburban and rural schools, 
while nearly a quarter (23.3 percent) attended schools in districts 
with urban, suburban, and rural schools.  14.6 million students (31 
percent of the nation’s traditional public school students) attended 
schools in growing districts with both rural and suburban schools.  
Given these commonalities between the districts in this sample and 
others across the nation, the findings from this dissertation have the 
potential to be relevant for many locations outside of the sample 
school districts and state.   
The nature of parents’ responses to student assignment and 
reassignment policies suggests that many disadvantaged families are not 
as engaged in the proactive policy-making processes as are advantaged 
families.  It is very possible that only the most advantaged among the 
disadvantaged have made these school choices, leaving the most highly 
disadvantaged students behind.  Therefore, additional efforts to 
support disadvantaged families become more aware of their school choice 
options and capable of acting on those preferences might increase 
educational equity in the district.  Additionally, many students appear 
to attend their non-choice, non-assigned schools.  Greater transparency 
about these alternate ways to opt out of school assignments and 
5 These totals were calculated by the author using public National Center for 
Education Statistics data on each public school in the country and its 
associated NCES location code, described above.  The 2010-11 school year was 
the most current year of public access data at the time of writing.   
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reassignments should also increase equity in the district, because the 
options should become more available to non-advantaged students.   
One key policy recommendation emerges from this research.  
Parents clearly are averse to their children being reassigned, 
seemingly because they seek to avoid the disruption.  School districts 
might be able to increase the rates of compliance through two 
mechanisms.  First, if they choose to enact reassignments, they can 
employ fill-as-you-go systems.  Using this design, when districts open 
new schools, they would populate a single grade each year.  For 
example, a new K-5 elementary school could open by only serving 
kindergarteners.  In the following year, the school would add a first 
grade along with a new kindergarten cohort.  In the fifth year of 
operation, the school would serve students in grades K-5.  This fill-
as-you-go system would not increase non-promotional school mobility in 
the district in any year.  Thus, if school districts employed this 
populating system, the disruptive effects of reassignments could be 
greatly reduced.  Indeed, no student would need to move schools other 
than the students who are already promoting to a new school level.   
The second policy option that minimizes disruptive moves is to 
accommodate population fluctuations at existing schools rather than 
opening new schools in growing areas or closing shrinking schools.  In 
so doing, no students would need to change schools despite the 
population fluctuations.   
 Finally, I suggest additional scholarly work of two primary 
types.  First, assignment and reassignment policies should continue to 
be studied.  These policies clearly affect students’ access to schools 
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and parents demonstrate that they make behavioral choices in light of 
both existing policies as well as changes to them.  Extensions of this 
work would benefit from qualitative work to solicit actual parental 
feedback to complement the inferences made in these analyses.  
Additional quantitative work on these policies could identify the 
policy impacts on changes in housing values, and of course, on student 
achievement and other educational outcomes.  Second, education policy 
research would benefit from additional work that links education 
databases with other geographic information.  These chapters provide 
several examples of how geographic information linked to student data 
can extend existing bodies of literature.  Many new and important 
policy-relevant questions can be answered if scholars continue to merge 
geographic and other non-educational secondary data sources with 
available student databases.    
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Appendix A: Supplemental Results from 
Chapter 1 
 
Logistic regression predicting whether a student has geographic 
data  
 
  
Number of observations 
= 108,686 
  
Pseudo r-squared = .039 
Dependent Variable=   
Indicator for student having matched address and assignment data  
    Independent Variables Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z 
Student Race (Ref Group= White)       
Black 1.35 0.08 0.00 
Latino 0.78 0.07 0.01 
Asian 1.07 0.12 0.57 
Multi/Other 1.09 0.10 0.38 
    Free/Reduced Lunch Eligible 1.04 0.10 0.65 
    Race * FRL Interaction (Ref Group = White * not FRL) 
Black * FRL 0.95 0.10 0.63 
Latino * FRL 1.17 0.16 0.25 
Asian * FRL 0.67 0.13 0.05 
Multi/Other * FRL 0.93 0.15 0.63 
    Geography of Students' Assigned School (Ref Group = Urban) 
Suburb or Town 1.93 0.11 0.00 
Rural 1.06 0.05 0.26 
    Race * Geography Interaction (Ref Group = White * Urban)   
Black * Suburb or Town 0.41 0.04 0.00 
Black * Rural 0.76 0.07 0.00 
Latino * Suburb or Town 0.57 0.10 0.00 
Latino * Rural 1.22 0.19 0.20 
Asian * Suburb or Town 0.62 0.14 0.04 
Asian * Rural 0.70 0.15 0.10 
Multi/Other * Suburb or Town 0.88 0.15 0.45 
Multi/Other * Rural 0.75 0.10 0.04 
120 
 
     Geography * FRL Interaction (Ref Group = Urban * not FRL) 
Suburb or Town * FRL 0.53 0.07 0.00 
Rural * FRL 0.88 0.09 0.22 
    Race * FRL * Geography Interaction (Ref Group = White * not FRL * Urban) 
Black * FRL * Suburb or Town 2.29 0.37 0.00 
Black * FRL * Rural 1.19 0.17 0.24 
Latino * FRL * Suburb or Town 2.12 0.46 0.00 
Latino * FRL * Rural 1.14 0.23 0.51 
Asian * FRL * Suburb or Town 1.97 0.77 0.08 
Asian * FRL * Rural 3.32 1.42 0.01 
Multi/Other * FRL * Suburb or Town 1.11 0.28 0.67 
Multi/Other * FRL * Rural 0.88 0.19 0.53 
    Other Independent Variables in Model       
Lagged 5-year District Population Growth 0.63 0.03 0.00 
Standardized Math Performance 1.09 0.01 0.00 
Math Score Missing Indicator 1.26 0.31 0.35 
Limited English Proficient 1.15 0.06 0.01 
LEP Missing Indicator 0.90 0.20 0.63 
Female Indicator 1.05 0.02 0.02 
Old for Grade Indicator 0.88 0.03 0.00 
Old for Grade Missing Indicator 0.25 0.06 0.00 
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Logistic regression predicting whether a student complies with 
their school assignment 
Number of Observations = 89,374 
Pseudo R2= 0.082 
Dependent Variable=         
Indicator for student not attending assigned school this year  
    Independent Variables Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z 
Student Race (Ref Group= White)       
Black 2.11 0.05 0.00 
Latino 1.41 0.05 0.00 
Asian 0.92 0.05 0.11 
Multi/Other 1.51 0.06 0.00 
    Students' FRL Eligibility(Ref Group = Not Poor)  
Free/Reduced Lunch Eligible 0.96 0.02 0.02 
    Geography of Students' Assigned School (Ref Group = Urban) 
Suburb or Town 0.63 0.01 0.00 
Rural 0.54 0.01 0.00 
    Other Independent Variables in Model     
Lagged 5-year District Population 
Growth 0.86 0.03 0.00 
Standardized Math Performance 1.06 0.01 0.00 
Math Score Missing Indicator 1.42 0.20 0.01 
Limited English Proficient 0.80 0.03 0.00 
LEP Missing Indicator 1.89 0.28 0.00 
Female Indicator 0.98 0.02 0.22 
Old for Grade Indicator 0.88 0.02 0.00 
Old for Grade Missing Indicator 0.63 0.10 0.00 
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  Weighted Predicted Probability of Attending School of Choice by 
Select Student Covariates 
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  Weighted Predicted Probability of Attending Non-Assigned 
Traditional Public School by Select Student Covariates 
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Appendix B: Supplemental Results from 
Chapter 2 
Logistic regression predicting whether a student is reassigned 
Number of Observations = 62,623 
Pseudo R2= 0.178 
Dependent Variable=  Indicator for Being Reassigned 
    Independent Variables Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z 
Student Race (Ref Group= White)       
Black 1.14 0.08 0.05 
Latino 0.92 0.10 0.47 
Asian 1.12 0.16 0.40 
Multi/Other 0.99 0.11 0.96 
    Students' FRL Eligibility(Ref Group = Not Poor)  
Free/Reduced Lunch Eligible 1.16 0.66 0.01 
    Geography of Students' Assigned School (Ref Group = Urban)
Suburb or Town 0.23 0.02 0.00 
Rural 0.44 0.05 0.00 
    Other Independent Variables in Model (All are calculated in initial school year)  
Lagged 5-year District 
Population Growth 0.24 0.02 0.00 
School Percent FRL 0.05 0.02  0.00 
School Percent Minority Students 37.73 10.74 0.00 
School Size (log) 3.26 0.40 0.00 
School Percent of Students at 
Grade Level in Reading 8.62 2.42 0.00 
Standardized Math Performance 0.96 0.02 0.12 
Math Score Missing Indicator 0.38 0.39 0.34 
Limited English Proficient 1.07 0.12 0.58 
LEP Missing Indicator 4.06 1.93 0.00 
Female Indicator 1.07 0.05 0.11 
Old for Grade Indicator 1.09 0.07 0.20 
Old for Grade Missing Indicator 2.12 2.22 0.47 
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  Kernel Density Distribution of Change in Percent Novice Teachers 
Among Reassigned Students 
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  Kernel Density Distribution of Change in Percent Novice Teachers 
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  Weighted Predicted Probability of Reassignment to Worse School, 
by Select Covariates, 2004-2010 
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Appendix C: Supplemental Results from 
Chapter 3 
Logistic regression predicting whether a student does not comply 
with next year’s school assignment 
Number of Observations = 57,891 
Pseudo R2= 0.094 
Dependent Variable=  Indicator for Not complying with next year’s assignment 
    Independent Variables Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z 
Student Race (Ref Group= White)       
Black 1.44 0.06 0.00 
Latino 0.89 0.06 0.06 
Asian 1.05 0.09 0.58 
Multi/Other 1.26 0.08 0.00 
    Students' FRL Eligibility(Ref Group = Not Poor)  
Free/Reduced Lunch Eligible 1.55   0.05  0.00 
    Geography of Students' Assigned School (Ref Group = Urban)
Suburb or Town 0.95 0.04 0.18 
Rural 0.92 0.04 0.06 
    Other Independent Variables in Model (All are calculated in initial school year)  
Indicator for being Reassigned 8.10 0.45  0.00 
Lagged 5-year District 
Population Growth 1.66 0.28 0.00 
School Percent FRL 2.17 0.31 0.00 
School Percent Minority Students 0.89 0.04 0.02 
School Size (log) 1.50 0.16 0.00 
School Percent of Students at 
Grade Level in Reading 1.17 0.05 0.00 
Standardized Math Performance 0.87 0.01 0.00 
Math Score Missing Indicator 1.08 0.26 0.76 
Limited English Proficient 0.89 0.05 0.05 
LEP Missing Indicator 1.00 0.29 0.99 
Female Indicator 1.02 0.03 0.37 
Old for Grade Indicator 1.06 0.04 0.10 
Old for Grade Missing Indicator 1.03 0.26 0.91 
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